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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on the economics of international environ-
mental agreements (IEAs). The essays provide both theoretical models and
experimental evidences for investigating individual incentives of participating
in IEAs based on di¤erent assumptions about preferences.
Chapter 1 and chapter 2 explore the incentives of participating in IEAs
with social preferences (also known as other-regarding preferences) in a static
model through experimental methods.
Chapter 1 examines the e¤ect of inequality-aversion. The theoretical pre-
diction for the proposed experiment in this chapter expects that the players
with a high degree of inequality-averse preference will violate the internal con-
straint and be absent in a membership game. As a consequence, the coalition
formation will become unstable. The experimental outcome conrms that a
stable coalition is indeed very rare. This is because the individual preferences
on inequality-aversion play a role in shaping coalition formation. However, in-
terestingly, highly inequality-averse subjects, while following their best strate-
gies to participate, are less likely to be absent from the coalition. According to
this study, the internal constraint is mostly broken by lowly inequality-averse
ii
subjects.
Chapter 2 investigates the e¤ect of altruistic preferences. The theoretical
prediction of this experiment is that the subjects with a high level of altruism
are more likely to resist the temptation of free-riding and thereby are more
likely to participate in a coalition. The experimental evidence conrms that
the coalition formation is a¤ected by individual altruistic preferences. How-
ever, the incentive of participation seems to be negatively correlated with the
altruistic attitude: the lower the degree of the altruistic preference is, the more
likely the subjects would participate.
Chapter 3 examines the impact of sustainability, which are considered as
cross-generational social preferences, on the coalition formation in a two-stage
game in two periods. This study conrms the importance of the awareness of
sustainability to international environmental conventions. When the intergen-
erational fairness and altruism are taken into account, a coalition formation
will be expanded. The numerical example indicates that the marginal cost
of the total emissions is an important factor for the formation of IEAs. In
contrast, the advanced level of technology development may lead a more ef-
cient production per unit of emissions, but it also encourages countries to
emit more in total and have a lower level of welfare. Only when the preference
weighting attached by one generation to the welfare of the next generation is
considered in international environmental conventions, a sustainable system
could be succeed.
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Introduction
It is widely recognized that the ecosystem on the earth has changed dramati-
cally over the last few decades due to rapid economic and industrial develop-
ment. Crafting solutions to balancing development and sustainability has been
urged by many international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN),
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and
the World Bank. It was thought that some environmental issues could be dealt
with locally, for example, at the national level. However, some environmen-
tal issues (such as water and air pollution, generation of solid and hazardous
waste, soil degradation, deforestation, climate change and loss of biodiversity)
usually are so complex and so widespread (across sovereign borders) that they
require collaboration between states. In this respect, inter-governmental law-
making and multi-disciplinary international research are vital and have become
common practices to tackle these complicated socio-environmental problems.
International environmental agreements (IEAs) are one of the mechanisms con-
structed to regulate and manage the situation. According to Mitchell (2003),
there are over 700 multilateral agreements and over 1,000 bilateral agreements.
IEAs have become the most important mechanism for solving the international
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environmental problems.
IEAs and international conventions have endeavoured to deal with a wide
range of environmental issues such as climate change, biological diversity, con-
trol of movements of hazardous wastes, and ozone layer. These topics can
be categorised into two main types: natural resource sharing and reducing
international environmental damage. The former targets at solving local en-
vironmental issues related to limited natural resources (e.g., water, sheries,
timber and other elements of the natural world), while the latter deals with
global environmental concerns (e.g., acid rain, sea pollution, ozone layer de-
pletion, climate change, global warming).
IEAs concerning natural resources are often bound by geographic bound-
aries (e.g. the atmosphere, rivers, lakes, oceans, and terrestrial habitats),
thereby the discussion usually stays at a regional level. The well-known sub-
category objectives related to these IEAs include freshwater resources (Con-
vention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Inter-
national Lakes, 1992), marine living resources (Common Fisheries Policy of the
European Union, 1970), terrestrial living resources (Convention on Biological
Diversity, 1992; International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994), and marine
environment resources (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships,
1983).
These resources, such as sh stocks, timber and coal, are common goods.
Being rival goods means that the proposals need to consider how to best utilise
these non-excludable goods, and identify an optimal amount of consumption.
If the resources are renewable, such as forests and sheries, then the proposals
would centre on how to sustainable harvest the resources by making sure that
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the quantity of consumption does not exceed the rate of regeneration. If the re-
sources are non-renewable, such as oil and gas (i.e., the stock of the resources is
nite), then the proposals would focus on identifying an optimal use that aims
to extend the length of exploitation. The mechanisms usually are engineered
in a way through which most common goods can be transformed into some
forms of revenues (e.g., scal, economic or other values) so that membership
countries are motivated to participate in this sort of IEAs.
A well known category regarding international environmental problems
less bound by national borders is the IEAs that aim to reduce environmen-
tal damages by developing a cleaning-up mechanism and an emissions abate-
ment scheme. The subcategory objectives related to these IEAs include ozone
layer depletion (Montreal Protocol, 1997), climate change (the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992), and acid
deposition (Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, 1985). The ob-
jectives of these IEAs are to manage public goods, which are non-rival and
non-excludable. Because of the characteristics of non-rival goods, free-riding
is unavoidable and is a key issue in this sort of IEAs. Negotiations are more
challenging than those in the rst category dealing with natural resources.
This thesis contributes to the discussion on motivations for countries to
participate in IEAs. More precisely, the focus is placed on the agreements of
abatement of carbon and greenhouse gas emissions. A substantial amount of
literature has approached this topic by examining the e¤ect of policy instru-
ments, such as punishment scheme, sanctions and side payment, and how they
enhance a stable coalition. However, the existing discussion mostly centres on
the design of IEAs frameworks rather than on the motivations of forming and
participating in IEAs. In order to rethink IEAs and the formation processes,
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the chapters in this thesis explain what motivates countries to take part in an
IEA without any policy instruments.
Literature review on the studies of international
environmental agreements
Since the environmental issues are at the top of the global policy agenda, there
has been an increasing amount of literature on international environmental
agreements. In terms of the methods, the studies can be roughly classied in
three main elds: game theory, calibration, and experimental method.
Game theory has been a common methodology for analysing the forma-
tion and stability of IEAs. If we consider international environmental issues
as public goods, there exist two main problems: free-riding and externalities.
No individual can be excluded from the others transboundary environmental
damage, nor can anyone share the benet of pollution abatement. Finus (2008)
claims that game theory is the ideal tool to study IEAs because game theory
is a mathematical method that studies the interaction between agents based
on behavioural assumptions about the preference of agents and makes predic-
tion about the outcome of these interactions by applying various equilibrium
concepts (Finus, 2008).
Due to the limitations of data collection, very few empirical studies ex-
amine policy e¤ects with empirical data. For instant, Bratberg et al. (2005)
employ the double di¤erence method to examine the policy e¢ ciency of Soa
Protocol during the period 1985-1996. Their empirical evidence shows that
the estimated yearly reduction in nitrogen oxides is nearly 2:1% higher than it
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would have been without the Protocol. Nevertheless, knowledge about global
environmental issues, such as climate change, is still very limited.
In order to estimate the impacts of the climate change policies, DICE (Dy-
namic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy), developed by Nordhaus
in 1994, was the rst integrated-assessment model and the most widely used
in the economics of climate change. This model evaluates di¤erent climate
change strategies by its general equilibrium approach. It has inspired the de-
velopment of several recent models, including MERGE (Model for Evaluating
Regional and Global E¤ects of GHG reductions) and STACO (STAbility of
COalitions) model. The MERGE model is developed by Manne et al. (1995).
It is a fully integrated applied general equilibrium model with a exible design
to evaluate the impact of climate policies on a wide range of contentious is-
sues, e.g., costs and benets of mitigation policies, valuation and discounting
issues. STACO is a game-theory-based project on the formation and stability
of international climate agreements. The initial model was built by Finus et
al. in 2006. A game-theoretic framework has provided this model the ability
to analyse not only the interactions between players but also the stability of
potential international climate agreements. Several topics have been investi-
gated, e.g., stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game, exclusive
membership, multiple coalition games, transfer schemes, quota, the stability
likelihood of coalitions under uncertainty, technological change, and sequential
games.
These calibrations are powerful research tools for estimating the inuences
of climate policies. However, they are constrained by model assumption and
exogenous scientic parameters. Recently, experimental research has proven
useful in evaluating policy instruments, particularly when empirical data is
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prohibitively costly (Eckel and Lutz, 2003). A growing number of literature in
experimental studies indicates that appropriately designed and tested policy
mechanism may help to alleviate environmental problems and provide useful
advice to policy makers (Bohm, 2003; Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin, 2011).
Barrett (1994) provides a seminal study that positions self-enforcingas
a key incentive for participating and interacting in IEAs. His key assump-
tion of the absence of a supra-national body to structure an IEA leads him
to suggest that participation is voluntary and all countries are free to enter or
to withdraw from a coalition. While an IEA aims to maximise the aggregate
net benet, individual nonsignatories aim to maximise their own net benet.
In joining an IEA, signatories receive a reward from acceding to the agree-
ment and avoid the punishment from withdrawing. Non-signatories may be
penalised but also enjoy the free-riding benet. The majority of the literature,
however, follows DAspremont et al. (1983) who argue that a stable coalition
has two constraints: the internal one where no signatory has any incentive to
withdraw from the coalition; and the external one where no nonsignatory has
any incentive to join the coalition.
Cross-border or macro-regional environmental issues concern public goods,
in general. One of the key characteristics of public goods is the free-riding
e¤ect. When a protable coalition is formed, all other countries outside the
coalition would receive positive externality from this grouping. In order to
minimise this e¤ect and maintain a stable self-enforcing coalition, an e¢ cient
policy mechanism is desirable.
To nd a well-designed IEA, several policy mechanisms have been discussed
in the literature and launched in practice. First of all, punishment schemes are
widely applied to existing IEAs. The majority of the literature in both theo-
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retical and empirical studies considers punishment schemes through economic
modelling to understand IEAs membership (e.g. Bahn et al., 2009; Barrett,
1994, 2001; Breton et al., 2010; Lessmann et al., 2009). Both theoretical and
empirical studies show that the absence of punishment schemes results in a
signicant disincentive to be a signatory of an IEA.
Secondly, the side payment mechanisms have had great inuences on the
structure of IEAs. Given a group of countries which have been committed to
cooperate, it is in principle possible to achieve Pareto improvement with a side
payment mechanism to encourage the nonsignatories to reduce their emissions
in exchange for transfers from the signatories. In other words, the mechanism
allows side payments from coalition members to non-members. However, Hoel
and Schneider (1997) argue that the proposal of o¤ering disengaged countries a
transfer to reduce their emissions (provided that the country does not commit
itself to cooperation) tends to reduce the incentive of the receiving country
to commit itself to cooperation. They emphasise that the side payment is
a disincentive for participation in an IEA. Also, total emissions will be even
higher in situation where side payments are in place to allow transfer and o¤set
than those without.
Di¤erent transfer mechanisms would lead to various results. In practice,
the transfer mechanism known as the joint implementation in the Kyoto
Protocol allows a country with an emissions reduction or limitation commit-
ment to earn emissions reduction units from another signatory. This transfer
mechanism allows the transfers of emissions permit among coalition members.
Some calibration studies of Nagashima et al. (2009) and Dellink and Finus
(2012) appraise such transfer mechanism can stabilise larger coalitions and
increase global abatement levels.
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Thirdly, the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), a well-known market-based
approach, has been launched in 2005 1. The ETS mechanism allows coun-
tries to trade six major greenhouse gases permit among signatories. These
trades allow transfers among countries in the coalition. The transfers imply
that if a signatory reduces its emissions more than the required amount for
achieving the assigned emissions permit level, the country can sell permits to
other signatories. McKibbin et al. (1999) examine the e¤ects of the tradable
emissions permit system proposed in the Kyoto Protocol with an estimated
multi-region, multi-sector general equilibrium model of the world economy.
Their results suggest that capital ows signicantly a¤ect the domestic e¤ects
of the emissions mitigation policy. However, Karp and Zhao (2010) claim that
the policy e¤ect of the ETS is ambiguous. Only with an escape clause policy
and a safety valve policy could the ETS have a signicant e¤ect on enlarging
the equilibrium level of abatement and the number of signatories.
Whilst this thesis acknowledges the importance of the transfer mechanisms
that is not of the scope of this thesis to explore policy mechanisms. For the
purpose of studying motivations and behaviours in the membership game, this
study simplies the allowance of the emissions permit to be non-transferable.
However, our design requires wealth transfers among member of the coalition.
In other words, signatories with high marginal benet of the total emissions
have to nancially assist those signatories with low marginal benet. This
strong assumption implies that coalition members share equal responsibility
to maximise the collective payo¤. The detail will be discussed in the section
of model setting in Chapter 1.
1European Union ETS was the rst large emissions trading scheme in the world. It was
launched in 2005 to combat climate change and is a major pillar of EU climate policy.
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Although Barrett (1994) provides a fundamental explanation for the di¢ -
culty in making a sustainable and stable IEA, there exist three major assump-
tions that limit his arguments.
The rst assumption, which states that all countries are identical, does
not correspond to the reality. This assumption suggests that the formation
of IEAs depends on the marginal benet of total abatements. This assump-
tion leads to some oversimplied results when describing some given scenarios
as will be seen in Chapter 3. These results are so oversimplied that likely
to be disconnected from the reality. The assumption of the participation of
heterogeneous countries has received more attention in recent studies. This as-
sumption of heterogeneous countries participating in IEAs helps underline the
asymmetries, the reactions and behaviours of countries with diverse interests
and characteristics.
But there are di¤erent ways of categorising heterogeneous countries. For
example, Barrett (2001) categorises asymmetric countries into rich coun-
tries with more ozone-depleting substances and poorcountries with less sub-
stances. He suggests that the rich countries can contribute more to the en-
vironment with their greater ability to pay and/or their larger inuence on
global emissions abatement. The poor have neither the ability to pay nor the
global inuence. They may be su¤ering from immediate and severe e¤ects of
the environmental damage, while the rich face a smaller level of damage. Bar-
retts results show that stronger asymmetry between players would strengthen
the willingness to participate in an IEA. His nding is supported by Dellink
and Finus (2012) who conduct a study on transfers of emission permits within
IEAs.
There also exists a huge volume of literature, including Bahn et al. (2009),
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which discusses countries with various marginal environmental damage costs.
Heterogeneity is also discussed in empirical studies, e.g., the experiment con-
ducted by Burger and Kolstad (2010) that examines the theoretical works
with two-type marginal benet of total contribution. Although the design
with two-type marginal benet could distinguish di¤erent forms of participa-
tion, the key question regarding individual incentives to participate has not
yet been answered. In other words, their studies did not illustrate why sub-
jects with the same type of marginal benet make di¤erent decisions. In order
to observe individual decisions, Chapters 1 and 2 are based on an experiment
built on an environment in which diverse marginal benets are considered.
The second weakness in Barrett (1994)s paper is the assumption of per-
fect information. This assumption ignores factors that may lead to imperfect
information and thereby is incapable of capturing uncertainty. Accurate infor-
mation is necessary for making international, especially global environmental
policies. Given their complexities, environmental problems are hardly well ex-
plained by the most advanced science, let alone well-known to decision makers
who are involved in the negotiation of abatements. For example, contradictory
scientic evidences and arguments for climate change have been observed over
the last decades (e.g. House of Lords, 2005). The disparity of evidences and
debates lead to the ambiguity of preferences of the general public.
Since the scientic evidence on the impact on the ecosystem is ambiguous,
a perfect far-sighted decision-making process does not exist. Not only are lim-
ited information and uncertainty crucial, so is how these factors shape decision
makersstrategies and behaviours. In order to study the implications of uncer-
tainty, previous studies have xed the distribution of the random parameters
and the operational patterns to specify how agents form their expectations
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(Finus and Pintassilgo, 2013). In addition to that, strategic decision makers
adapt to cope with uncertainty and collect more information to facilitate their
decision making. In order to model the learning process and its e¤ect, Finus
and Pintassilgo (ibid) also take timeinto account. They argue that timing
is important in the learning process. Learning takes place when the informa-
tion about probability of heterogeneity is revealed either ex ante or ex post to
countries. No learning takes place when countries know the information after
making decisions; complete learning takes place when they know the informa-
tion before making decisions. If environmental threats are not as serious as
scientists predict, some over prepared solutions will lead to unnecessary waste.
On the other hand, if threats are more severe than expected, more actions have
to be taken to cover the loss for not enough preparation. This possible loss
in the future is far larger than the spending on the protection in the present.
Besides, the key point is that most environmental damage is irreversible, such
as ozone layer depletion. Bearing such irreversibility in mind, a decision maker
who has no information may prefer over-protection to no preparation.
Kolstad (2007) and Kolstad and Ulph (2008) consider the e¤ects of the
learning process and irreversibility in a single decision maker model condi-
tioned by uncertainty. They assume that players could have two types of
learning processes: partial learning and complete learning. They argue that
uncertainty in a complete learning process leads to more cooperation but lower
aggregate net benets than in an environment where no learning takes place.
Partial learning would lead to lower membership and even lower expected ag-
gregate net benet. Their ndings, surprisingly, show that certain information
has a negative e¤ect on IEAs. Helm (1998) provides an explanation for this:
countries can use the veil of uncertainty to hide their distributional interests
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and lead to the success of IEAs without engaging in any learning process.
Dellink and Finus (2012) investigate uncertainty with their simulation on cli-
mate change. They nd that learning processes (both complete and partial)
can only be positive if emission permit transfers are considered.
To specify and enhance our research questions, the design of the public
goods game in our experiment provides information with regard to the subjects
own payo¤s as well as those of others. But even so, the outcomes may not be
as consistent as the Nash predictions.
The last fundamental but questionable assumption in Barretts model is
that agents are egoists. In light of the Nash equilibrium, this implies that
a rational agent would choose the highest payo¤. The assumption has been
widely employed in the majority of the theoretical studies of IEAs (e.g. Barrett,
2001; and Breton et al. 2010). However, recent experimental evidences have
suggested that the assumption of egoistic preferences is not enough to explain
individual decision makersbehaviours in an interactive game (Kosfeld et al.,
2009; Burger and Kolstad, 2010). These studies claim that people are far less
likely to free ride and more likely to cooperate than the egoistic prediction
assumes. Hence, social preference (or other-regarding preference) has been
proposed in recent studies (e.g. Kolstad, 2014) to address this gap. This
study follows this trend of thought and considers two types of other-regarding
preference, namely inequality-aversion and altruism, to develop the model and
experimental design.
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Structure of the Thesis
This thesis consists of three original studies on the economics of international
environmental agreements (IEAs). The focus lies in individual behaviours and
decision-makings of IEAs. Three hypotheses are proposed and tested. All
studies intend to contribute to theoretical as well as current policy-related dis-
cussion. In terms of the latter, when being applied to real-world policy-making,
it is anticipated that a better understanding of will help tackle environmen-
tal issues e¢ ciently, thereby reduce the risks of environmental disasters and
enhance human welfare.
The three hypotheses to be tested in the thesis can be divided into two
themes from a methodological perspective.
The rst theme, featuring Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, employs experimental
methods to examine the e¤ectiveness of the theoretical prediction of other-
regarding preferences on the static formation of IEAs. Individual payo¤s in a
membership game are deemed mutually a¤ected. Chapter 1 focuses on the ef-
fect of fairness, which shapes the payo¤ gaps between agents. Chapter 1 inves-
tigates agentsdecision-making in a membership game which are not as Nash
equilibrium predicts when heterogeneous preferences on inequality-aversion are
presented. In our theoretical model, in order to achieve fairness, agents who
have a higher degree of inequality-aversion are more likely to punish free riders
by leaving a coalition. Unlike what has been suggested in the existing liter-
ature, the prediction on the formation of an IEA could be equal to or larger
than the Nash prediction, or be an unstable coalition.
To explore the e¤ect of inequality-averse preferences on cooperation, an ex-
periment with two stages is conducted. Before playing rst of the experiment,
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which imitates an IEA formation, subjects are asked to take an inequality-
averse test which indicates their individual social preferences. Chapter 1 as-
sumes that subjects care about not only their own payo¤s but also the gap
between their own payo¤s and those of others. In other words, subjects con-
sider the variances of individual payo¤s.
Chapter 2 investigates how the levels of altruism shape the incentives to free
ride. We assume that agents may have di¤erent altruistic preferences which
inuence their decisions in a coalition game. Similar to the design in Chapter
1, an individual altruistic test is provided before a public goods game. Subjects
are expected to consider not only their own payo¤s but also the overall payo¤
of all subjects.
The result shows that, in order to enlarge the overall welfare, agents have
strong altruistic preferences would give up the free-ride rewards. Our theoret-
ical prediction claims that the formation of an IEA could be equal to or larger
than the Nash prediction.
The experimental evidences in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 make two key con-
tributions to the existing discussion. Firstly, they provide a novel exploration
of individual behaviours in a IEA, based on a case study of unique equilib-
rium coalitions. Although it is di¢ cult to generalise from a case study, it still
helps to identify behaviour patterns of individual decision-makers since each
subject has a weakly dominant strategy to determine their status in a mem-
bership game. Secondly, the experiments examine and verify the theoretical
predictions with two types of other-regarding preferences.
Both the experimental evidences and theoretical predictions conrm that
the willingness to participate in IEAs is signicantly associated with the degree
of inequality-aversion and the degree of altruism. However, the experimental
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results are against the hypotheses: the results in Chapter 1 show that the lower
the degree of inequality-aversion a subject has, the more likely the subject is
to behave strategicly. When subjects dominant strategies are to join the
coalition, those having a lower degree of inequality-averse preference are more
likely to punish free-riders by leaving the coalition. When their dominant
strategies are not to join, the subjects with lower degree inequality-aversion
have higher willingness to cooperate. The results in Chapter 2 illustrate such
strategic behaviours in the membership game. Subjects who have lower degree
of altruistic preferences are more likely to cooperate in the public goods game.
Overall, the experimental evidences show that subjectsdecisions di¤er and
change because of their social preferences.
Chapter 3 is a purely theoretical study. Unlike the static decision discussed
in the rst two chapters, Chapter 3 aims to explore the causal relationship be-
tween the preference weighting to the welfare of the next generation and the
incentives of participating in IEAs. In order to examine the cross-generational
e¤ect, this chapter creates a two-generation model which describes the deci-
sions made by the present generation who may or may not take the welfare
of the future generation into account. In this model, sustainability is dened
by the criterion that the welfare of the future generation is not worse than
that of the present generation. The study aims to nd the emissions level and
coalition formation in di¤erent policy contexts.
By evaluating the impacts of the cross-generational fairness and altruism on
the formation of IEAs, Chapter 3 identies the importance of the perceptions
of sustainability to IEAs. We substantiate the concept of sustainability,
a common (and perhaps over-loaded) buzzword often used at international
environmental conventions. In so doing, we provide economic explanations
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about how cross-generational payo¤s can be maximised and how to extend the
length of consumption of limited resources. Unlike international nancial and
monetary agreements which focus on on-going real-world conicts and issues,
IEAs are created to avoid possible disasters in the future which are di¢ cult to
predict. This chapter o¤ers an economic explanation for some characteristics
of IEAs.
The numerical examples in Chapter 3 show that when the future generation
is concerned by the current one, a country is more willing to participate in an
IEA. However, the discount factor attached by one generation to the welfare
of the next has small and ambiguous impact on the coalition formation. The
technology level has a positive e¤ect on the emission level, but not on the
formation size. In other words, the level of technology level may not be the
key factor that mitigates the free-riding e¤ect, because an e¢ cient technology
could also increase the incentive of emitting. On the other hand, the marginal
cost of total abatement has negative impact on the emissions level. A grand
coalition is possibly formed when the marginal cost is very small.
The thesis concludes with discussions on future studies extended from the
lessons learned from investigating individual behaviours of dealing with IEAs
memberships.
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Chapter 1
Inequality-Averse Preference for
International Environmental
Agreements
1.1 Introduction
International environmental agreements (IEAs) are typically viewed as coali-
tions of agents providing public goods (e.g., abatements of greenhouse gas
emissions). Since the publication of Barrett (1994), the literature on IEAs
by and large assumes that countries self-enforce themselves to join an IEA.
It means that countries sign an IEA for economic reasons. A stable IEA ex-
ists under both internal and external constraints. When the payo¤ of being a
signatory is better than that of being a nonsignatory, a country has an incen-
tive to participate and the coalition is stable internally. On the other hand,
when a nonsignatory has no incentive to join the coalition and decides not to
participate, the IEA is stable externally. From the macroscopic perspective, a
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robust IEA requires both internal and external stability. It is a state where no
insider wants to leave and no outsider wants to enter. Nevertheless, the incen-
tives of an individual agent have not been fully examined from the microscopic
perspective in the existing literature. Although the majority of the studies on
IEAs has investigated incentives (e.g. Barrett, 2001; Finus, 2008), their main
focus is on the formation of IEAs from a macroscopic perspective. Individual
incentives have been over-simplied in the literature. There may exist several
equilibria, individual incentives are not clear even when a coalition is stably
formed.
This chapter discusses individual incentives of joining a coalition, and their
roles in an interactive game. The interaction between agents is closely linked
with agentsindividual preferences. This study employs the microscopic per-
spective to explore how individual preferences shape decision making.
In the existing literature, two issues still await to be addressed: the ar-
guably unavoidable free-riding e¤ect and a presumed egoistic preference.
Free-riding has largely been considered as the most important obstacle for
the formation and existence of successful IEAs. This is the main reason why,
a large IEA is not easy to be formed without any policing mechanism, in light
of the Nash equilibria static game. However, recent experimental evidences
on IEAs suggest that people are far less likely to free ride and more likely to
cooperate than the theory suggests (Kosfeld et al., 2009; Burger and Kolstad,
2010). But why this is so has not been well-explained by the models in the
literature.
Furthermore, existing research ndings on IEAs largely presume that an
individuals preference is egoistic/selsh. However, the solutions to interna-
tional environmental problems require cooperation and interaction between
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di¤erent nations at a global scale so as to prevent environmental or natural
disasters or damages from happening. International cooperations are called
for to deal with global issues. In such interactive game with common goal to
minimise the loss of the society and environment, the assumption of a pure
egoistic preference may not be enough to capture players behaviours.
Some have suggested to address this limitation by taking the role of other-
regarding preferences (also known as social preferences) into account. Kos-
feld et al. (ibid) employ the inequality-averse preference (proposed by Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) and conrm with laboratory-based evidence that when
inequality-averse players exist, the coalition is no longer a Nash prediction,
and the grand coalition becomes an expected equilibrium outcome. On the
other hand, Kolstad (2014) adopts Charness and Rabins (2002) social pref-
erences theory which suggest that agents mainly care about three things :
private payo¤, fairness in payo¤s, and overall e¢ ciency. In contrast to the
nding of Kosfeld et al. (ibid), Kolstad argues that the size of an equilibrium
of a coalition is smaller when social preferences exist.
Although the coalition formation with social preference has been exam-
ined in the literature, its inuence on individual behaviours in an interactive
coalition has not been fully explored. In other words, individual incentives
for participating in a coalition are still unclear. This is partly due to the fact
that economic models usually are based on several assumptions to reduce un-
certainties and ambiguities. But these assumptions make capturing individual
incentives di¢ cult. For example, even with the assumption of heterogeneous
agents, players were given the same payo¤ table in an experiment. There ex-
ist multiple equilibria and several possible coalition combinations, individual
incentives are not possible to be predicted.
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To address these gaps in experimental studies, eight particular treatments
which have unique equilibrium coalition are employed in this study. In these
treatments, each agent has a weakly dominant strategy to follow. The indi-
vidual preference is therefore identiable and can be observed.
This design o¤ers two main advantages: rstly, this study endeavours to
investigate incentives for participating in IEAs. If a coalition has more than
one equilibrium, individual decisions cannot be predicted. But, if we have a
coalition with a unique equilibrium, it would provide a suitable environment
to observe individual decisions when every player has a best strategy to make.
Secondly, the hypothesis of this study assumes that the other-regarding pref-
erence would inuence the equilibrium di¤erently from the egoistic preference.
This entails that a coalition would be formed di¤erently when individuals care
about others agentspayo¤s.
To the best of our knowledge, what motivates individuals to participate
in a public goods coalition has not yet been fully explored in the existing
literature. This study asks the following questions: Does the concern about
fairness change playersdecisions? If so, how much would they care? How do
individualssocial preferences a¤ect their own incentives for participating in a
public good game?
To answer these questions, we have designed an experiment as follows. It
comprises of two parts: the rst part aims to nd out the individual inequality-
averse preference. The subjects of the experiment are paired and asked to
choose from a certain fair payo¤ and an all-or-nothing payo¤. When the ex-
pected payo¤ is higher than the fair payo¤, those who prefer to have the fair
payo¤ would be considered as inequality-averse players. They would be more
likely to break the internal and external constraints in the coalition game.
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The second part is a public good game. The subjects are grouped into
5-player groups. Since our main interest lies in the formation of IEAs, the
experiment has taken out the abatement game, and turned it into a public
good game which mimics the membership decision process. The subjects are
given particular payo¤ tables to decide whether or not to join the coalition.
Bearing in mind the results from the rst experiment, the predictions with the
other-regarding preferences are expected to explain a smaller free-riding e¤ect
and various coalition combinations.
Our theoretical nding predicts that, if the internal and external constraints
hold and the condition for the unique equilibrium is satised, the coalition
formation could be either a unique n-member coalition, or a unique coalition
which is larger than n, or an unstable coalition with di¤erent inequality-
averse preferences. The constraints could be violated when agents have strong
attitude of inequality-aversion. However, our experimental evidence does not
fully support the theory. In terms of the individual decisions, when subjects
could free-ride, those with a higher marginal benet were less likely to join a
coalition and prefer to have a lower payo¤. On the other hand, the subjects
with a high degree of religious belief were more likely to be free-riders by not
joining a coalition and having higher payo¤.
From the questionnaire in the experiment, we learnt that right-wingers are
more likely to build a larger coalition when they could be free-riders. Com-
paring to the results on the internal constraint, right-wingers are more likely
to violate both internal and external constraints. Right-wingers tend to act
strategicly by punishing and compromising when they are in di¤erent roles.
The chapter is structured as follows. After the introduction, in Section 2,
we will compare a benchmark model based on the assumption of homogeneous
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players with the model we develop based on heterogeneous players and a unique
equilibrium coalition. In Section 3, the data from two experiments which are
based on the theory discussed in Section 2 will be presented. In Section 4, we
discuss the implications of the model and possible applications, and conclude.
The theoretical proofs, the instructions of the experiment are included in the
appendix.
1.2 The model
1.2.1 Benchmark model with heterogeneous players
Supposed there are N countries with di¤erent marginal benet of total abate-
ment, we label them as country 1, 2, :::, N . There are now 2N   (N + 1)
possible coalition combinations 1. In order to clarify, we assume that player 1,
2,:::, n are in the group to form an IEA, player n + 1, n + 2, :::, N are not 2.
We rank n countries in the coalition according to the value of their marginal
benet of abatement going from high to low as 1 > ::: > n. On the other
hand, the nonsignatories are also ranked from high to low as n+1 > ::: > N
Any marginal benet of total abatement (k; 8k 2 [1; :::; N ]) is in the range
between 0 and 13. The unit cost of abatement for each country is assumed as
1.
1Any coalition needs at least 2 players. No coalition is a possible solution if no one
cooperates.
2Any coalition needs at least 2 members, so n 2 [2; N ].
3The meaningful range of the marginal benet of total abatement (k) is between 0 and
1. When k is too large (1  k), an IEA is unnecessary because players already have the
incentive to abate fully. When the aggregate marginal benet is too small (
NX
k=1
k  1),
a protable IEA is also non-existent because all players would pollute anyway. When the
marginal benet is in between, there may exist stable coalitions where signatories abate and
nonsignatories pollute.
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Each country faces a game which run in two stages: at the rst stage, play-
ers play a membership game where they decide whether to participate in the
coalition or not. At the second stage, given the decision made at the rst stage,
signatories and nonsignatories play the emissions abatement game respectively.
Each nonsignatory makes her own decision on emissions abatement with the
objective of maximising her individual payo¤. Meanwhile, members follow a
common decision on abatement with the common objective of maximising the
coalition payo¤. We solve this two-stage game by backward induction.
We start with the abatement game. Let any nonsignatory js abatement be
denoted by xj. In order to simplify the model, the cost and benet functions
are both linear and the normalised level of abatement (xj) is in the range
between 0 (implies full pollute) and 1 (implies full abate).
With a protable n-member coalition, a nonsignatory js payo¤ j is max-
imised by choosing its abatement level (xj). The problem of the nonsignatory
j is as follows:
max
xj
j = ( xj) + jX 8 nonsignatory j = n+ 1; :::; N (1.1)
where X =
nX
i=1
xs +
NX
j=n+1
xj
where xj is the individual abatement with its marginal benet rate j
4. X is
the total abatement which includes n signatoriesaggregate reduction (
nP
i=1
xs)
5 and (N   n) nonsignatoriesaggregate reduction (
NP
j=n+1
xj). From the rst
order condition of (1.1) with respect to xj, the optimal abatement level for a
4j 2 fn+1; :::; Ng
5Because members in the coalition move as one, the aggregate emission abatement would
be
nP
i=1
xs = n  xs.
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nonsignatory j is doing no abatement (xj = 0).
For any signatory i, all members act as one to maximise the coalition payo¤
and share this coalition payo¤ equally. The n-member coalition payo¤ (s)
is the overall pre-redistribution payo¤ of all members (i; 8i = 1; :::; n). The
coalition payo¤ is maximised by choosing the common abatement (xs). The
problem of the coalition is as follows:
max
xs
s =
X
i
i (1.2)
=
nX
i
[( xs) + iX]
From the rst order condition of (1.2) with respect to xs, we have
@s
@xs
=  n+ n
nX
i
i = 0 (1.3)
When
Pn
i i < 1, polluting is the best strategy but then the coalition would be
meaningless. To form a protable coalition, the total contribution should go
beyond the threshold which the sum of marginal benet of members is lager
than 1 (
Pn
i i  1) and the best strategy for all members is fully abating
(xs = 1).
Since the coalition aims to maximise its payo¤, individual decisions of mem-
bers should achieve this goal. Burger and Kolstad (2010) note that majority
voting rule, unanimity and joint payo¤ maximisation are all equivalent under
the assumption of homogeneous agents. However, with heterogeneous agents,
they suggest that majority voting reects the interests of the median voter
and may not reach a joint payo¤maximum. Although wealth transfers among
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member of the coalition is often suggested as being politically infeasible, Kol-
stad (2014) states that sharing the wealth within the coalition might be
appropriate.
Hence, to achieve the goal of maximum a coalition payo¤, each member
would share the same responsibility. We assume that the coalition payo¤ is
equally shared by all signatories. Any signatory i with a n-member coalition
has a post-redistribution payo¤
s =
1
n
s (1.4)
It should be noted that a rule of the coalition requires coalition members us-
ing transfers to equalise net payo¤s between agents. Such rule achieves a less
unequal distribution of payo¤s through transferring. This assumption implies
that for the main purpose of this chapter, it is di¢ cult to separate out the
issue of IEA formation and its impact on fairness from the fact that the IEA is
itself a mechanism for achieving a less unequal distribution of payo¤s through
using transfers. Countries with higher marginal benet of the total abatement
are more likely to leave the coalition ex post, because those countries could
earn higher payo¤ for the absence. However, we assume that countries have
the full information when they agree to participate in an IEA, they know the
consequence of being signatories and nonsignatories. Signatories will commit
to stay in the coalition and make transfer to equalise individual payo¤s. We
appreciate that this is a strong assumption6. However, considering each mem-
6The rule would deter a country to abandon its commitment on membership by some
policies, e.g. high penalty punishment and international sanction.
The issue of di¤erent policy instruments of transfer and commitment could be discussed
by further studies.
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ber have to move as one to maximise the coalition payo¤, every member would
share equally responsibility. Hence, our design of sharing the coalition is still
an adequate solution.
Hence, the post-redistribution payo¤ of a signatory i in a protable coali-
tion is
s =  1 +
nX
i
i (1.5)
In the membership game, players are asked to decide to participate in a
coalition or not. The decisions are made simultaneously. With the internal
and the external constraints by DAspremont et al. (1983),
Internal constraint : sn (n
) > nsn (n
   1) (1.6)
External constraint : sN (n
 + 1) < nsN (n
) (1.7)
There exist stable coalitions. The internal constraint (1.6) denotes that
a signatory has no incentive to leave the n-member coalition and n is the
stable number to maintain the coalition. If it is satised, every one would like
to participate in the coalition. The external constraint (1.7) describes that a
nonsignatory has no incentives to participate in a coalition as the (n + 1)-th
member. If it is satised, all nonsignatories do not want to participate 7.
7The stability of the coalition can be explained with two 3-player cases. In case (i), if
the aggregate marginal benet of total abatement is too small to form a protable coalition,
there is no stable IEA. For example, when the set of the marginal benet of players 1, 2 and
3 is f0:4; 0:3; 0:2g, no player would like to participate because all possible combination are
unprotable.
In case (ii), when the aggregate marginal benet is high enough, there might exist an
equilibrium or equilibria coalitions. For example, given the set of marginal benet is
f0:7; 0:6; 0:35g, there exist two stable coalitions {1; 2} and {1; 3}. In the former case, the
internal constraint is satised when both players 1 and 2 have no incentive to dissolve the
coalition by leaving. On the other hand, the external constraint is satised when player 3
has no incentive to join since the reward of free-riding is better than that of participation.
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A special case of homogeneous countries Given that all countries have
the identical marginal benet of total abatement which is in the meaningful
range between (1=N) to 1. When the marginal benet  is too large (1  ),
an IEA is unnecessary because players already have the incentive to abate
fully. When  is too small (0 <  < (1=N)), a protable IEA is also non-
existent because all players would pollute anyway. When the marginal benet
is between (1=N) and 1, there may exist stable coalitions where signatories
abate and nonsignatories pollute.
The payo¤s for a nonsignatory j and a signatory i with a n-member coali-
tion are
j (n) = n
s (n) =  1 + n
Any nonsignatory would take the free-riding benet and receive a higher payo¤
than any signatory does.
In this membership game, each player have to decide whether or not to join
a coalition. Since all participants are self-enforced, players can not reject or
accept new entrants 8. On the one hand, a nonsignatory would have a higher
payo¤ than a signatorys. With the assumption of homogeneity, everyone
would prefer to be a free-rider i.e. a nonsignatory. On the other hand, if
no coalition is formed, all countries would have zero payo¤. A coalition is
therefore necessary to all countries.
8After the membership status is determined, members in the coalition act as one with the
joint decision made by either the majority voting (Burger and Kolstad, 2010) or a random
leadership. Theoretically, results in both cases are the same since agents are assumed to
have the same preference.
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As mentioned previously, the stable coalition exists when the internal and
external constraints both are satised. The internal constraint (1.6) requires
any signatory has no incentive to leave the coalition. The left hand side of this
constraint is the payo¤ of being a signatory ( 1 + n). It is better to be a
nonsignatory (0) as a collapsed coalition in the right hand side. The absence of
any signatory would lead the coalition to be unprotable ( 1+ (n   1) < 0)9.
Thus we can comfortably say that n is the smallest integer better than the
inverse of the ratio of abatement benet to cost (n  1=).
The external constraint (1.7) describes that any nonsignatory has no in-
centives to participate in a coalition. The right hand side of the constraint is
the payo¤ of being a nonsignatory (n), which is better than that of being an
extra participant ( 1+ (n + 1)) on the left hand side. The constraint is held
since all nonsignatories have no incentive to join. As discussed previously, the
ratio of marginal benet to cost, , is between 0 and 1. With the assumption
of homogeneous players, this constraint is always satised.
We summarise the results so far in Table 1.1. A coalition of size n is stable
if and only if both internal and external constraints are satised. If the size of
the coalition is smaller than n, the coalition collapses and no country earns
anything. When the size is (n + 1), signatories might have the incentive to
leave. Hence, n is the stable size for the coalition. 10 
9The player most likely to leave an IEA is the one with the highest payo¤ from abatement,
because that country is being asked to make transfers to other countries which can be avoided
by leaving the coalition. So the relevant marginal condition for coalition members applies
potentially to all members of the IEA. The internal constraint means no signatory has an
incentive to leave as long as:  1 +
X
i2S
i  (n (S)  1) i 8i 2 S where S is the set of
signatories and n (S) is the number of signatories. As this shows it is the signatory with
the highest benet which is most likely to wish to leave (as long as this does not destabilise
the IEA). However, if the coalition without country i is unprotable, every players payo¤
becomes 0.
10To dene the stable size, following Burger and Kolstad (2010), we need the rounding-
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Number of
signatories
Signatorys
payo¤
Nonsignatorys
payo¤
0   0
(n   1) 0 0
n  1 + n n
(n + 1)  1 +  (n + 1)  (n + 1)
N  1 + N  
Table 1.1: Corresponding individual payo¤s in a coalition
This study attempts to test the theory based on heterogeneous agents by
conducting an experiment. Existing experimental studies (such as Kosfeld et
al., 2009) assume that all agents are identical. However, this assumption is
far from the reality. Even the assumption of heterogeneity is considered by
Burger and Kolstad (2010), there exist more than one equilibrium coalition in
their experimental design. Though the formation of IEAs could be expected,
it is not enough to predict individual decisions in the membership game by
these past studies. In order to address this gap in the literature, this study
considers the condition of uniqueness of equilibrium. The condition provides
the existence of a unique stable n-member coalition where n is the minimum
number to form a protable coalition. By this condition, individual decisions
could be predicted.
Condition 1 (Uniqueness of equilibrium)
Suppose all players are self-interested, when the internal and the external
constraints are satised, there exists a unique stable n-member coalition if and
upfunction which rounds a real number up to an integer by dening I (t) as the smallest
integer greater than or equal to t. With this denition, we therefore claim that the equilib-
rium of a coalition size is n = I (1=). The stable size of a coalition is equal to the smallest
integer greater than the inverse of the marginal benet of abatement. Any combination
which achieves this condition is a possible solution. This result implies that a higher ratio
() causes a smaller coalition.
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only if 1 + n >
PN
i=1 i
The proof is presented in Appendix 1.1.
The condition implies that the stable coalition is unique if the absence
of any single signatory cannot be replaced by the entry of all nonsignatories.
The unique equilibrium condition ensure that the formation is the only one
protable coalition ( 1 + Pni=1 i > 0). If any player from player 1 to n
leaves the coalition, there is no substitution to form a protable coalition.
Connecting the internal constraint (
Pn
i=1 i > 1) with the unique equilibrium
condition, we have
nX
i=1
i > 1 >
n 1X
i=1
i +
NX
j=n+1
j
By subtracting
Pn 1
i=1 i from both sides, we derive that
n >
NX
j=n+1
j
Whilst we acknowledge this indeed a strong condition, however, in order
to identify the individual incentives to participate in the coalition, such a
condition provides an environment where each agent has a weakly dominant
strategy in terms of their own payo¤s.
The following 3-player example helps us to understand the purpose of this
condition.
Example of a 3-player game
Given a 3-player game, let players 1, 2 and 3 have various abatement parame-
ters 1, 2 and 3 respectively
11. There are 23   4 = 4 possible coalition sets
11We dene 0 < 3 < 2 < 1 < 1
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Player 1 Player 3 Payo¤ if Player 2 join Payo¤ if Player 2 not join
IN IN max[1 + 2 + 3; 1]
1 + 22 when 1 + 3  1
1 when 1 + 3 < 1
IN OUT max[1 + 2; 1] 1
OUT IN max[2 + 3; 1] 1
Table 1.2: Payo¤ table for Player 2
which include the full coalition set f(1; 2; 3)g, and the two-member coalition
sets f(1; 2) ; (1; 3) ; (2; 3)g.
Table 1.2 lists the possible payo¤s for player 2. The rst and second column
show the membership status of player 1 and 3 respectively. If player 2 decides
to join the coalition, payo¤s for the three possible cooperation combinations
are shown in the third column. If player 2 decides not to join, the possible
payo¤s are listed in the fourth column.
Following the internal constraint, player 2 would form a coalition with
player 1 if 1 + 2  1. Meanwhile, with the external constraint, player 3 has
no incentive to participate if 1 + 2 + 3  1 + 23. Thus, the 2-member
coalition f(1; 2)g is a stable equilibrium. However, there could be another
equilibrium f(1; 3)g when it is also protable (1 + 3  1). If the equilibrium
set has more than one combination, the individual incentive to participate in
the coalition is not clear. Both players 2 and 3 have the incentive to cooperate
with player 1, but also want to free-ride.
With the unique equilibrium condition (1 + 3 < 1), player 3 has no in-
centive to cooperate with others. Hence, joining is the dominant strategy for
both player 1 and 2.
Figure 1.1 presents the marginal benets to three di¤erent players into three
dimensions. The parameters are ranked from high to low as 1 > 2 > 3. The
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium boundary in a 3-player game
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internal and the external constraints are the blue area and the red one in the
gure respectively. When the parameter sets are within the constraints (which
is in the middle of the chart), there exist stable coalitions, anywhere beyond the
boundary is an unprotable coalition set. There might exist multiple equilibria
in this space. Taking the set f0:8; 0:7; 0:6g for an example, the coalition sets
{1; 2}, {1; 3} and {2; 3} are also stably protable. If the parameters are too
small to be in the space, the coalitions are unprotable and unstable (which is
in the right black area of the chart). Taking the set f0:3; 0:2; 0:1g for example,
any combination from this set cannot form a protable coalition.
As mentioned earlier, this study focuses on a unique equilibrium only. The
boundary of the unique equilibrium condition is presented as the green area in
the lower chart. The space within the areas of blue, red and green is where a
unique equilibrium could exist. The marginal benet of player 3 is not large
enough to encourage the player forming a coalition with either player 1 or 2. In
other words, both players 1 and 2 are irreplaceable by player 3. Compared to
the space in the upper gure, the space in the lower gure is smaller. Though
our focus is subject to specic set-ups, individual decisions are still easier to
be predicted and explained through this experimental analysis. 
1.2.2 Inequality-averse preference in a coalition game
The constraints above are considered assuming individuals have egoistic prefer-
ences. As mentioned previously, this assumption fails to capture the idea that
individuals may behave di¤erently in a practical interactive game. In order
to address this limitation, we now incorporate the idea of other-regarding
preferences into our analysis to examine individual incentives.
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Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), we assume that subjects dislike unfair
outcomes at di¤erent levels. Subjects feel disadvantaged when they are better
o¤ or worse o¤ in material terms. With this concept, the utility of a player k
of a protable n-member coalition can be represented as
uk (n) (1.8)
= k (n)  k
N   1
X
k0 6=k
max (k0 (n)  k (n) ; 0)  k
N   1
X
k0 6=k
max (k (n)  k0 (n) ; 0)
where Player k0 denotes all players except player k. The rst term is the
payo¤ of player k and the second term indicates the average utility loss from
other player k0 with the disadvantage-loss parameter k. The third term mea-
sures the average loss from other player k0 with the advantage-loss parameter
k, which is assumed within the range between 0 (inequality-neutral) and 1
(highest degree of inequality-aversion).
Extended from the constraints and Condition 1, an unique n-member
coalition exists when all agents are self-interested. When the individual inequality-
aversion is considered in the utility function, the following hypothesis provides
the conjectured outcome of coalition formation.
Conjecture 2
If the internal and external constraints hold and the condition for the unique
equilibrium is satised, the coalition formation could be either a unique n-
member coalition, or a unique coalition which is larger than n, or an unstable
coalition with di¤erent inequality-averse preferences.
The explanations of the possible outcomes are shown in Appendix 1.3.
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Three possible outcomes are depending upon di¤erent circumstances of indi-
vidual inequality-averse preferences :
(i) When all players have no inequality-aversion or a low degree of inequality-
aversion, there exists a unique n-member coalition equilibrium.
(ii) When any player from players n + 1 to N has a high degree of
inequality-aversion (large ), the external constraint could be violated. If
other things are equal, the coalition formation is stable and larger than n.
(iii) When any player from players 1 to n has a high degree of inequality-
aversion, the internal constraint could be violated. The coalition formation
then becomes unstable.
Without taking inequality-aversion into account, a unique stable coalition
is formed with three constraints. When the inequality-aversion is considered
as part of the individual preferences, there are a number of e¤ects. First,
inequality-aversion reduces countriesutility when payo¤s are not equal. The
incentive of being a nonsignatory therefore decreases and the external con-
straint is more likely to be violated. This will tend to increase the size of a
stable coalition.
Second, countries with strong inequality aversion would be encouraged to
stay in an IEA or join it to spread the benets of equalisation because of the
transfer mechanism where signatories share the same coalition payo¤. How-
ever, except for a grand coalition, any combinations of IEAs has a free-riding
e¤ect. An expanding IEA will tend to exacerbate the payo¤ gap between
signatories and nonsignatories. Signatories with a strong sense of inequality-
aversion may violate the internal constraint if the payo¤ gap is large. Under
this condition, the most likely outcome would be to have no IEA at all, so a
certain level of inequality aversion can destabilise an IEA.
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When inequality-aversion is taken into account, the net e¤ect of these two
factors shapes the stability and the formation of IEA. When a country decides
to join a coalition given the rst e¤ect, the participation will lead to a smaller
advantage loss but a larger disadvantage loss. With this character, a stable
coalition can not be easily expand by the rst e¤ect. On the other hand,
as long as stable equilibrium is not a grand coalition, there exists inequality.
The payo¤ gaps between signatories and nonsignatories are enlarged with the
second e¤ect. The internal constraint is more di¢ cult to be satised and the
coalition formation becomes unstable.
The following example could improve our understanding.
A Numerical example
Here is a numerical example to explain this proposition. Supposed that there
are ve agents with various marginal benets of total abatement, (0:675, 0:375,
0:125, 0:1, 0:075). When the agents have no inequality-aversion or a low degree
of inequality-aversion which is no more than 0:4, agents 1 and 2 follow the
internal constraint to join the coalition while agents 3, 4, and 5 follow the
external constraint and stay away from the coalition. The formation of the
coalition would therefore converge to the 2-member coalition equilibrium. The
coalition is stable and protable over a 100-round repeated game. The total
contribution in 100 rounds is presented in the upper chart in Figure 1.2.
When the internal constraint is violated due to an agent having a degree
of inequality-aversion higher than 0:4, the coalition is no longer stable. The
lower chart in Figure 1.2 shows the case where agent 2 violates the internal
constraint when his inequality-aversion factor  is greater than 0:4. This is
a noisy result is due to the high degree of inequality-aversion of agent 2.
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Figure 1.2: Numerical example of a 5-player coalition game
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The agent only has an incentive to join when the coalition size is large enough.
Nevertheless, other nonsignatories have no intention of giving up the free-riding
benet and participating in the coalition. Hence, the consequence is that the
coalition is unstable over rounds. 
In terms of the design of this particular example, the external constraint
will not be violated given the highest degree of inequality-aversion. Hence, a
larger stable coalition is not possible in this case.
1.3 Experiment design and procedure
The experiment was conducted at the centre for EXperimental EConomics
(EXEC) laboratory at the University of York (UK) and programmed with
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). There were 50 subjects who were registered on
the ORSEE registration system by Greiner (2004). They were students from
di¤erent countries and in various disciplines at the University. This sample
that mimics the diversity in the real world where international policy makers
and multidisciplinary knowledge are present helps understand IEAs formation.
The instructions (see the Appendix 1.4) were provided on subjectsdesks. The
instructions consist of three parts. This chapter endeavours to investigate the
coalition formation through individual preferences of inequality-aversion. The
data are drawn from part 1 and part 3 in the experiment.
To ensure the data quality, the subjects had to comprehend the rules of
the game as much as possible. To do so, the experimenter introduced the rules
and gave the participants time to read through the instructions thoroughly and
accomplish the controlled questions. In the end of each part of the experiment,
four control questions were asked to test the subjectsunderstanding of the
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payo¤ tables. A new part would only start if all subjects had answered all
control questions correctly.
According to our assumption, the subjects should be self-motivated. The
subjects were therefore required to maximise their own payo¤s. In addition,
to simplify the experiment, the subjects were not allowed to exchange infor-
mation; no conversation was allowed (except for asking the experimenter to
clarify the questions) during the experiment.
A questionnaire was circulated before the experiment to gather demograph-
ical information, including the subjects degree disciplines, age (the year they
were born), ethnicity, political orientation, and the level of belief in a religion.
This questionnaire is designed to gather more explanation on their decision-
making in the experiment. The rst three questions are objective and the data
shows the diversity of the participants. The results are presented in the Figures
1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6. Figure 1.3 shows subjectsmajor: 11 participants re-
cruited were reading Economics; 8 participants in Humanities; 13 participants
in Science; 1 participant in Laws; 9 participants in Engineering; 1 participant
in Psychology; 7 participants in other disciplines and no recruit was reading
Business-related disciplines. Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of ethnicity: 32
subjects were white; 15 were Asian or Asian British; 2 were Black or African
or Caribbean or Black British; and 1 fell into the category of any other ethnic
groups. Also, all participants were undertaking undergraduate or postgradu-
ate courses at the University and their average age was 25 years-old (the oldest
being 45 and the youngest being 21).
The last two questions were concerning their subjective preferences. Figure
1.5 presents the distribution of their level of belief on religions while subjects
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Figure 1.3: Degree subject distribution
Figure 1.4: Ethnicity distribution
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Figure 1.5: Religious preference distribution
were asked to identify themselves on a scale ranging from level 1 (not religious
at all) to 5 (extremely religious). In the results, 20 subjects consider them-
selves to be atheist. Meanwhile, 6, 8, 9, and 7 subjects consider themselves as
religious, with mild belief, median belief, strong belief and pure religionists re-
spectively. The average level is 2:5. The distribution shows that the subjects
religious belief is between mild to median belief, overall.
The other question aims to indicate the subjectspolitical preference (level
one indicates left, level two centre-left, level three neutral, level four centre-
right and level 5 right). The distribution is presented in Figure 1.6. In our
sample, 7 subjects self-identied themselves as left wing; 10 as centre-left; 25
as neutral; 7 as centre-right and 1 as right wing.
The main experiment is comprised of two parts, as shown in Parts 1 and 3
in Appendix 1.4. The experimental procedure was designed as follows.
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Figure 1.6: Political preference distribution
1.3.1 An inequality-averse preference test
The instructions of the rst part are shown at Part 1 in Appendix 1.4. This
test aimed to examine the subjects individual attitude towards inequality-
aversion. To measure a subjects inequality-averse preference, the subjects
who did not know each other were paired together. The subjects did not
know their partners and the partnersdecisions during the whole
test. Their payo¤s were determined by their own decisions as well as their
partners decisions. This was to understand the individual preferences without
knowing their strategies they played. The subjects were required to answer a
series of decision questions in 11 rounds as shown in Table 1.3. Option 1 meant
the subjects share the same allowance, while Option 2 meant the subjects could
take all-or-nothing with a certain probability.
Given the allowance £ 5, which would be shared by a subject (denoted as A
afterward) receiving x and another subject (denoted as B afterward) receiving
42
Round Option 1 Option 2
1 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 0%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 100%
2 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 10%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 90%
3 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 20%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 80%
4 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 30%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 70%
5 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 40%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 60%
6 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 50%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 50%
7 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 60%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 40%
8 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 70%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 30%
9 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 80%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 20%
10 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 90%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 10%
11 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 100%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 0%
Table 1.3: Distribution of payo¤ in all 11 rounds in the inequality-aversion test
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Figure 1.7: Subject As inequality-averse preference
(5  x). Subject As inequality-averse utility was determined by both her and
the other subjects shares as displayed in Table 1.3.
UA (x; 5  x) =
8><>: x   [(5  x)  x]x   [x  (5  x)]
if x  2:5
if x  2:5
(1.9)
The upper function represents Subject As utility when A has less than
half of the total allowance. The parameter  is the coe¢ cient of the average
disadvantage loss of A. On the other hand, when A has more than half of
the total allowance, the lower function is As utility with the coe¢ cient of the
average advantage loss.
The function can be presented as the solid line in Figure 1.7. The horizontal
axis is the allowance of A while the vertical axis is As corresponding utility.
The utility depends on the payo¤ set of subject A and the opponent B
which is presented as (£ x, £ 5  x). From (1.9), we derive that A s utility of
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(£ 5, £ 0) is UA (5; 0) = 5   5, and the utility of (£ 0, £ 5) is UA (0; 5) =  5,
and the utility of (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) without any inequality is UA (2:5; 2:5) = 2:5.
We normalise by setting [UA (5; 0)  UA (0; 5)] =5  1.
Given that a series of probabilities is involved in the inequality test, this test
could be characterised by strategic uncertainty. The subjectsrisk attitudes
may be involved in their decisions. For instance, even the expected payo¤ of
taking Option 2 is higher than the payo¤of Option 1, a risk averse subject may
prefer to the equal-share option because she or he fears the possible loss by
taking Option 2. There are some experimental designs, such as Blanco et al.
(2011) and Yang et al. (2012), that attempted to exclude strategic uncertainty.
and avoid risk attitudes. They employed two games to capture the factors that
advantage or the disadvantage the subjects.
The relationship between risk-aversion and inequality-aversion has been
discussed by several recent studies. An experimental study by Carlsson et
al. (2005) also found that people who are inequality-averse are more risk-
averse, and that the reverse relation also holds true: risk-averse individuals
tend to be more inequality-averse. Given the same individual risk, Kroll and
Davidovitz (2003) provided another experimental evidence that most of the
subjects preferred equal distribution to inequality.
Whilst it should be noted that our experimental design did not exclude
the subjectsrisk attitudes, our design is still superior in the sense that the
normalisation provides a normalised inequality-averse utility in one game12.
While other studies avoid strategic uncertainty in their experiments, there exist
12We acknowledge that there are other methods to measure attitudes to inequality. Dif-
ferent to other experiments focus on social preferences, there were two social preferences
tests and one public good game in our experiment. This design could measure individual
inequality-averse attitude without complex procedures.
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other factors which could lead to a biased estimation of inequality-aversion.
For example, Yang et al. (2012)s experiment shows that subjects may have a
negative advantage loss. It implies that subjects may prefer to show o¤ rather
than feel guilty when they are advantaged. Such bias does not arise in our
design because the utility has been normalised.
To nd out the inequality-averse preference, we asked each subject to choose
between two options in each row of Table 1.3. The rst option is a certain op-
tion where both players share the allowance equally (£ 2:5). The second option
is an uncertain option that the subject would win all-or-nothing depending on
probability. The given probability decreased by 10% in each round.
Since the allowance was a good, the subjects in theory would prefer to have
more. The rst row in Option 2 shows that if the probability to yield (£ 5)
is 1, any subject would choose Option 2 rather than Option 1. On the other
hand, at the bottom row in Option 2, if the probability of the set (£ 5, £ 0) is
equal to 0, subjects would prefer Option 1 rather than Option 2. Hence, we
assume that subjects will choose Option 2 in the rst few rows and Option 1
in the last few. For each subject with a consistent preference, there exists a
point with a certain probability where the subject would switch from Option
2 to Option 1. We denote the probability of (£ 5, £ 0) at the switch point by p.
Then subjects feel indi¤erent between (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure and (£ 0;£ 5) with
probability (1  p) and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability (p). Such probability p can
be seen as the weight of inequality aversion.
In Option 2, a subject is given (£ 5) with the probability p and (£ 0) with
the probability (1  p). In Option 1, the subject is given (£ 2:5) for sure. The
subject would feel indi¤erent between the sharing combination (£ 2:5, £ 2:5)
and the mixed combination of (£ 0, £ 5) with probability (1  p) and (£ 5, £ 0)
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with probability (p). We can present this in an equation as
U (2:5; 2:5) = (1  p)U (0; 5) + pU (5; 0) (1.10)
The inequality-averse parameters  and  would be found through p. Given
that the range between the utility of all U (5; 0) and nothing U (0; 5) is nor-
malised, the inequality-averse preference was indi¤erent when subjects are dis-
advantaged and advantaged ( = ). Although it was mentioned earlier that
a player might su¤er more from inequality when she is disadvantaged (  ),
there are two reasons that support us to do so. In practice, it is not easy to
nd a subjects preference without standardising the unit of the utility. In the
literature, the experimental evidences show that the disadvantage factor is not
necessarily smaller than the advantage factor (Dannenberg et al., 2007; and
Yang et al., 2012).
Hence, we assume that the inequality-averse preference are indi¤erent to
being disadvantaged and advantaged.
When the subject is advantaged, U(5; 0)=U(2:5; 2:5) = 1=p, we have
 =  = p  1
2
(1.11)
Since the probability p is in the range of 0 and 1, the inequality-averse para-
meters  and  are at the range of  1
2
to 1
2
.
Subjects are inequality-neutral when their switch points are at p = 0:5
where the expected payo¤ is equal to the fair payo¤. The inequality-averse
preference  =  = 0 . In other words, the utility of taking all the allowance
(£ 5) is not two times higher than that of equally sharing the allowance (£ 2:5).
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When the switch point is p > 0:5, subjects are inequality averse and their
utilities are lower than their monetary payo¤s. The extreme case is when
p = 1, and  is 0:5. It implies that subjects have indi¤erent preferences of
taking one unit payo¤ or equally sharing the allowance. When the advantage
aversion is very high ( > 0:5), it is considered as altruism, which is not able to
capture in this design13. Altruists would prefer to give goods to others in order
to achieve fairness. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, altruism is
an important topic that needs to be explored in future studies as it can happen
in reality.
When p is less than 0:5, subjects are not inequality-averse (neither advan-
tage acceptors nor disadvantage acceptors). While Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
exclude inequality acceptors in their assumption, inequality-aversion is consid-
ered in this study as it may happen in the experiment. For these subjects, they
would be considered as inequality-lovers or risk-lovers (because the experiment
has strategic uncertainty). Both inequality and risk lovers are possible but un-
common in reality (as seen in the experimental result later), so our study does
not focus on this issue. Hence, these subjects have been excluded from our
sample14.
1.3.2 Experiment of a coalition game
The instructions of this part are shown in Part 3 in Appendix 1.3.
To concentrate on the entry decision, we simplify the two-stage game into
the membership game. The scenario in the second stage has been modied
13Because the probability p is only in the range of 0 and 1.
14The existing probabilities in the test may introduce a bias by involving risk-averse
preference and hence weaken the conjecture.
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to show the situation when a protable n-member coalition is formed (the
coalition generates a positive payo¤ if the aggregate benet-to-cost ratio of
signatories is larger than 1,
Pn
i i > 1). In this case, all signatories abate and
all nonsignatories pollute. Otherwise, the coalition collapses and all players
pollute. Hence, all elements in the payo¤ set (1 (n) ; 2 (n) ; :::; N (n)) are
non-negative. It implies that all players behave rationally in maximising their
payo¤s.
The social welfare is the aggregated payo¤s from all nonsignatories and the
coalition payo¤ . The maximum welfare exists when the grand coalition is
formed 15. All players face a dilemma of being a nonsignatory with free-rider
payo¤ or being a member with the shared payo¤.
A public good game with various payo¤ tables was conducted. The results
from the previous part were used to predict whether the subjects would violate
the stability constraints in the coalition game. In the theoretical model, this
is a two-stage game. The rst stage is the membership game, where subjects
decide whether or not to join a coalition. The second stage is the abatement
game. In the abatement game, since the payo¤is a linear function, the decision-
making would be straightforward. When a subject decides to join a coalition,
she would abate fully at the second stage. When her decision is not to join,
she would not abate at all at the second stage. Based on this, we simplify the
two-stage model to a one-stage membership game in the experiment.
In this part, subjects were randomly assigned to groups of ve persons.
They did not know who they were playing with, but they did know that they
15The total payo¤ is  = s +
P
j
j = [( n) +
Pn
i i] +
h
n
P
j j
i
. Because only a
protable coalition is counted, the total payo¤ is maximised when the grand coalition is
formed  = ( N) +PNi i.
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were playing with the same people during the whole session. In our assump-
tion, subjects should be self-motivated. Subjects were therefore required to
maximise their own payo¤s.
In each treatment, each subject was given a particular payo¤ table of all
the possible coalition combinations. A group of N subjects would generate 
2N  N   1 combinations. In order to generate a simple and clear table
for subjects, the number of 5 subjects was set in a group with 26 possible
combinations.
The game was a one-shot game, and decisions in each round were indepen-
dent.
With this design, the subjects know no more than their own inequality-
averse preference. However, the experiment allowed subjects to have a learning
process so that the coalition would converge to the Nash equilibrium. The game
was played 15 times in each sub-treatment. Subjects were given 180 seconds to
make their decisions of whether or not to join the coalition. According to the
pilot experiment, this time setting gave subjects enough time to make their
decisions. Any decision which was not made within this amount of time would
be counted as non-participation. This rule is sensible because the decision was
asked whether or not to join a coalition with a non-participating status.
Finally, the coalition formation and all subjects payo¤s in the group were
reported on the result screen.
Subjects should make their decisions based on their economic incentive.
In order to ensure subjects were aware of their prot-maximising incentives
rather than other non-economic incentives, the reference to environmental is-
sues was removed from the instruction. The level of marginal benet of the
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Round Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
1  15 0:675 0:375 0:125 0:10 0:075
16  30 0:075 0:15 0:25 0:3 0:35
31  45 0:40 0:65 0:075 0:10 0:125
46  60 0:05 0:1 0:4 0:35 0:3
 means the weakly dominant strategy of the player is joining the coalition.
Table 1.4: List of parameters of marginal benet for players taking Treatment
1
Round Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
1  15 0:075 0:1 0:45 0:35 0:25
16  30 0:125 0:1 0:15 0:5 0:55
31  45 0:45 0:6 0:05 0:2 0:1
46  60 0:45 0:25 0:2 0:15 0:05
 means the weakly dominant strategy of the player is joining the coalition.
Table 1.5: List of parameters of marginal benet for players taking Treatment
2
total abatement was labelled as parameter (k; 8k 2 [1; :::; 5]) in the exper-
imental design. There are two treatments with di¤erent parameter sets. 20
subjects took Treatment 1 and the rest of the subjects took Treatment 2.
The individual parameters in the Treatment 1 are listed in Table 1.4, and the
parameters in Treatment 2 are listed in Table 1.5.
According to Condition 1, we can claim that a unique equilibrium could be
found in some particular cases. The theoretical result suggests that a unique
equilibrium exists within the internal, the external and the unique constraints.
To achieve a unique equilibrium, the experiment was built with some particular
parameters mentioned earlier in the theory. Subjects with high marginal bene-
t parameter are labelled () in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, they were predicted to have
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a weakly dominant strategy to join. Eight treatments within the constraints
were selected in the experiment. The theoretical size of the stable coalition in
treatments was from 2 to 4. Each group was given four sub-treatments with a
di¤erent number of subjects predicted to be in the stable coalition.
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the treatments which were designed to ensure
a unique stable IEA based on the assumption of no inequality-aversion. Each
sub-treatment had a unique equilibrium and each subject had a weakly domi-
nant strategy in the membership game. Meanwhile, we propose in Conjecture
2 that di¤erent attitude to inequality-aversion may lead to higher member-
ship or no stable IEA. The internal constraint is more likely to be violated by
individuals with high degree of inequality-aversion. But due to the internal
transfers, a nonsignatory would gain less advantage loss but more disadvantage
loss if she or he decides to join a coalition. Hence, the external constraint is
not easy to be violated. The experiment in this study is able to test whether
subjects with high inequality-aversion are more likely to violate the internal
constraint and lead to unstable.
Given the particular parameter, each subject was assigned an individual
payo¤ table which contained all possible coalition combinations with the cor-
responding payo¤s. If the possible coalition was protable, from (1.5), the
payo¤ of a subject who decided to join is
s =
8><>: 30 ( 1 +
Pn
i i)
0
when
Pn
i i  1
when
Pn
i i < 1
Meanwhile, from (1.2), the payo¤ of a subject who decide not to join is
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j =
8><>: 30 (n j)0
when
Pn
i i  1
when
Pn
i i < 1
The monetary payo¤s were 30 times higher than the theoretical payo¤s in
the previous section. This design did not a¤ect the theoretical predictions, but
the diversity of the marginal benets became more signicant to subjects.
When a possible coalition is unprotable, all subjects in the group gain
nothing for return. The possible payo¤s for subjects were from £ 0 and up to
£ 24. The payo¤ depended on the given parameters and the coalition forma-
tion. In the experiment, we simplied the decision-making process by reducing
the calculation process. With the payo¤ table, subjects could easily nd the
corresponding possible payo¤s without working on the payo¤ function.
Given the results obtained in the inequality-averse test, an example at
Table A1-1 in Appendix 1.4 is explained as follows. The table illustrates 26
possible coalition combinations for 5 players 16 and the corresponding payo¤s.
A stable coalition is formed when the internal and the external constraints are
held. An unique stable 3-member coalition exists when Players 3, 4 and 5 obey
the internal constraints and Players 1 and 2 obey the external constraints.
In the case of the external constraint, we assume that all subjects are
inequality neutral except for Player 1. Player 1 would obey the constraint if
the utility of being a nonsignatory (6:75  2:25
4
  15:75
4
) is better than being
a signatory (3:75   8:25
4
) . However, the subject would violate the external
constraint when she has high inequality aversion. Since the disadvantage-
aversion is indi¤erent to the advantage-aversion, Player 1 would violate the
16A possible coalition combination requires at least 2 players. Thus the number of the
possible coalition combinations is 25   (5 + 1).
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external constraint when 16
13
<  (or p > 45
26
) . However, altruism cannot be
captured in this test because Player 1 is unlikely to join the coalition with
Players 3, 4 and 5, as mentioned earlier.
Similarly, Player 2 would violate the external constraint only when the
subjects preference p > 37
26
. It means that Player 2 is very unlikely to join the
coalition.
In the case of the internal constraint, if others are inequality-neutral, Player
3 would follow the internal constraint when the utility of joining (1  8:5
4
) is
higher than the utility of not joining (0). However, if Player 3 has strongly
inequality-averse preference, p > 0:97, Player 3 would violate the internal
constraint and not join the coalition. With the unique coalition condition,
whether the external constraint is obeyed by others or not, the equilibrium
would be a failed coalition because Players 3, 4 and 5 are irreplaceable.
Similarly, Players 4 and 5 would violate the internal constraint if their
preference p > 0:97.
We can therefore calculate the threshold to break the internal and external
constraints for each subject. Subjects who break the external constraint would
have very high advantage aversion. However, we should note that altruism can
not be captured in our test. On the other hand, the internal constraint is more
likely to be violated. The thresholds are also very high. This could explain
that subjects are likely to follow their weakly dominant strategies.
1.3.3 The results from the experiment
In the inequality-averse test, each subject was asked to choose from two options
in 11 rounds. In the theoretical prediction, the decision in round 1 would be
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Figure 1.8: Number of subjects taking Option 1in each round
Option 2and the decision in round 11 would be Option 1. One turning
point was expected and that was when the decision changed from Option 2
to Option 1. The result demonstrates that 33 out of 50 subjects had no more
than one switching point in 11 rounds, while 2 subjects took Option 1 in the
whole part. The degrees of inequality-aversion were therefore determined.
Figure 1.8 presents the number of subjects taking Option 1 in each round.
The majority had their switch point at rounds 3, 4, 5, or 6. After round
7, almost every subject took Option 2. Although the experimental design
allowed the existence of inequality acceptors, as predicted in the assumption
of the theory, the degree of inequality-aversion was unlikely to be negative.
As mentioned earlier, ve subjects were excluded because they were negative
inequality-averse.
Table 1.6 shows the OLS estimation of inequality-averse preference. The
dependent variable is average times of taking the Option 1 in the inequality-
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Variable
Inequality-aversion level
OLS Regression
Constant term
 12:53
(11:15)
AGE
0:007
(0:006)
POLITIC
0:005
(0:03)
RELIGION
 0:02
(0:02)
Log Likelihood 19:13514 R-squared 0:042
Total Observation 50
Note: Each cell contains coe¢ cient and standard error in parenthesis.
, ,  are signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Table 1.6: OLS estimation of inequality-averse preference
averse test. Independent variables are subjectsage (AGE), political attitude
(POLITIC), and religious attitude (RELIGION). The result shows that these
factors from our questionnaire have insignicant e¤ect on subjectsinequality-
averse preferences.
In the membership game, all subjects were put into 10 groups and took
four sub-treatments in 60 rounds. Groups 1 to 4 used Treatment 1 in Table
1.4 and groups 5 to 10 used Treatment 2 in Table 1.5. Each subject in the
group was given a di¤erent value of the marginal benet parameter . This
parameter implied their contribution to the group, if they decided to join in.
When the total contribution of a group was over 1, the coalition was protable
and everyone received the payo¤ which depended on their decisions. Other-
wise, an unprotable coalition brought nothing to all the players in the group.
With the assumption of no inequality-aversion, the peculiar design of this ex-
56
periment leads to a unique equilibrium and the total contribution of this stable
coalition is 1:05.
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Figure 1.9 shows the results of the total contribution of groups 1 to 4. The
charts in the rst row present the total contribution of groups 1, 2, 3, and
4 in sub-treatment 1 respectively. Similarly, the charts in the second, third
and fourth rows present the total contribution of groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 in
sub-treatments 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
Figure 1.10 shows the results of the total contribution of groups 5 to 10.
The charts in the rst row present the total contribution of groups 5, 6, 7, 8,
9 and 10 in sub-treatment 1 respectively. Similarly, the charts in the second,
third and fourth rows present the total contribution of groups 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and
10 in sub-treatments 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
In light of the study population, protable coalitions were formed in 387
of 600 rounds. The various forms of group formation lead to di¤erent group
payo¤s. For example, group 6 and group 8 both take Treatment 2. Group 6
forms protable coalitions in 47 rounds, but group 8 achieved that in only 12
rounds. Both treatments provided subjects with weakly dominant strategies
to take. If subjects in the group all made their weakly dominant strategies,
the internal and external constraints were held and the coalition was at Nash
equilibrium. It happened in 112 out of 600 rounds and such a coalition was
not stable as predicted in the theory. According to the experimental results,
more than two third of the protable coalitions were formed and they were
larger than the Nash equilibrium size.
As shown in Figures 1.9 and 1.10, the formation of a coalition is neither
stable nor convergent to a equilibrium in 15 rounds. Compared to the numer-
ical example in Figure 1.2, the experimental outcome shows a similar kind of
uctuations. If the hypothesis is true, this interesting result could be inter-
60
preted as the e¤ect of inequality-aversion. In other words, the inequality-averse
preference has an impact on the coalition formation.
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In order to test our hypothesis, we examine the subjectsdecision in the
past round and their individual inequality-averse preferences to predict their
next move. The indicated level of inequality-aversion is therefore employed to
predict individual decisions in a coalition game. Figure 1.11 presents the total
contribution of Groups 1 to 4. Similarly, the actual total contribution and the
predicted total contribution with and without inequality-aversion of Groups 5
to 10 are shown in Figures 1.12 and 1.13.
The blue line with spots in each chart presents the actual total contribution
in a sub-treatment. Given the results in the past round, the red line with
cross marks are the prediction of the total contribution with the decision in
the past round and subjectsindividual inequality-averse preferences. There
are two main reasons for employing this prediction. First, the subjects know
their own inequality aversion parameter, but not others. The test in Part 1
of the experiment was anonymous and independent of Part 3, the subjects
should not learn others inequality-averse preferences. Second, learning and
reciprocity are not considered in our model. Though the experiment design
allows subjects nding their dominant strategy, it is not expected to gure
out others social preference. Since the subjects know no more than their own
individual preferences and the historical decisions on the membership game,
our prediction should be based on such information17.
In order to examine our conjecture, the green line with triangle marks is
generated only with the individual decisions in the past round only. In other
words, this predictions are based on the assumption of neutral inequality-averse
17This experimental design attempts to purify the individual decision, any bias from other
subjectspreferences should be minimised. It would be a potentially interesting but very
complex issue to model (essentially testing Bayesian learning), we will leave this challenge
to the future studies.
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Figure 1.12: The actual total contribution and the predicted total contribution
of Groups 5 to 7
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Figure 1.13: The actual total contribution and the predicted total contribution
of Groups 8 to 10
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preference.
Compared to these neutral predictions, in most cases, the predicted total
contributions with inequality-aversion is higher. Both predictions are higher
than the protable threshold during the whole experiment. When subjects
have high inequality-aversion, the result is not as unprotable as we expected.
Besides, when the inequality-aversion is not taken into account, the predictions
are more stable and closer to the actual outcomes.
When we examine the individual decisions, the predictions with inequality-
aversion match the actual decisions by 1838 over 2800 observations (65:6%)
while those neutral predictions match the actual decision by 74%. The inter-
nal constraint was not supposed to be violated but the results suggest oth-
erwise. In the sample of 1540 observations, the predictions with inequality-
aversion match the actual outcome at 77:2% of the observations, while those
neutral predictions matched by 84:9%. On the other hand, the predictions
on those observations when subjects should follow the external constraint are
lower. Amongst the 1260 observations, the predictions with inequality-aversion
matched by 51:5% and the neutral predictions match by 61:0%.
To further the discussion, the possible factors are examined by Maximum
Likelihood Estimation(MLE) of binary probit regressions. The variables in
Table 1.7 are the decision made at the last round (DECISION( 1)), the av-
erage number taking Option 1 in the inequality-averse test (INEQ), the year
subjects were born (AGE), the political preference from left (1) to right (5)
(POLITIC), the religion preference from atheist (1) to religionist (5) (RELI-
GION), the weakly dominant strategy from not joining (0) to joining (1) (WD
STRATEGY), the marginal benet of the total contribution (), and the total
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Variable
Probit
MLEs(1)
Probit
MLEs(2)
Probit
MLEs(3)
Probit
MLEs(4)
Probit
MLEs(5)
Constant term
8.32
(12.49)
0.52***
(0.16)
-9.77
(20.54)
-0.05
(0.05)
11.01
(16.72)
DECISION (-1)
1.19***
(0.07)
1.36***
(0.13)
1.01***
(0.09)
INEQ
0.50***
(0.19)
0.81***
(0.24)
-0.15**
(0.08)
AGE
-0.005
(0.006)
0.005
(0.01)
-0.005
(0.008)
POLITIC
0.05
(0.03)
-0.13**
(0.05)
0.23***
(0.05)
RELIGION
-0.05**
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.17***
(0.03)
WD STRATEGY
1.16***
(0.10)

-1.27***
(0.26)
-6.45***
(1.11)
TC (-1)
-0.16
(0.12)
-0.26
(0.21)
-0.36**
(0.16)
Log Likelihood -1165.01 -621.21 -515.43 -769.35 -629.48
Total Observation 2520 1500 1400 1120 1120
Observation with
decision is Join
1692 1279 1185 507 507
Note: Each cell contains coe¢ cient and standard error in parenthesis.
, ,  are signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Table 1.7: Probit estimations of probability of joining a coalition
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contribution of the group at the last round (TC ( 1)).
As mentioned earlier, the data of ve subjects has been excluded because
their attitude to inequality is opposite to our assumption which says the sub-
jects dislike inequality. We examine 45 subjects who have di¤erent degrees of
inequality-aversion. The estimation of Probit MLEs(1) covers all observations
of 2700 decisions which were made individually. Because two variables depend
on the outcomes at the last round, only 2520 observations are used for the re-
gression. Amongst these 2520 observations, the subjects decided to join 1692
times and not to join 828 times.
The inequality-averse factor (INEQ), the weakly dominant strategies (WD
STRATEGY) and the decision at the last round (DECISION( 1)) have a pos-
itive e¤ect on the decision at the 1% signicance level. This interesting result
implies that the higher inequality-aversion a subject has, the higher incentive
this subject has to participate in the coalition. Also, when the decision at the
last round or the weakly dominant strategy is being made, the subjects are
more likely to choose joining. The marginal benet of total contribution ()
has a negative e¤ect on decision-making at the 1% signicance level due to the
free-riding e¤ect when the subjectsweakly dominant strategy was not to join.
Nevertheless, it is insignicant even if the subjects join a coalition in the case
where the total contribution at the last round (TC( 1)) is to join. Reviewing
the factors listed in the questionnaire, (AGE) and (POLITIC) appear to be
statistically insignicant. But, (RELIGION) has a negative e¤ect at the 5%
signicance level. That means, the more religious a player is, the less likely
s/he will join.
It was assumed that the subjects with a higher degree of inequality-aversion
were more likely to violate the internal and the external constraints. In or-
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der to assess the internal constraint, we use Probit MLE(2) to examine the
observations where the subjectsweakly dominant strategy was to join. 85%
out of the 1500 observations obeyed the internal constraint. In our hypothe-
sis, the subjects with a higher degree of inequality-aversion were expected to
violate the internal constraint, and the coe¢ cient of INEQ should be nega-
tive. However, interestingly, the results show that INEQ has a positive e¤ect
at the 1% signicance level. This striking outcome implies that subjects with
a higher degree of inequality-aversion are more likely to to join a coalition.
Consequently, this outcome suggests that these subjects with a higher degree
of inequality-aversion are less likely to violate the internal constraint. That
said, the subjects have stronger incentives to form a protable coalition when
their sense of inequality-aversion is higher. Perhaps due to those subjectss
preference of having a fair outcome, a safe act which could keep their pay-
o¤s low appears to be more favourable than a risky strategy of punishing
other outsiders and forcing them to participate. Those with a lower degree
of inequality-aversion tend to act strategicly. They usually attempt to punish
free-riders from time to time and force outsiders to participate in a coalition.
Such strategic behaviour makes the coalition process unstable over rounds.
Comparing the experimental outcomes with the numerical example, we have
observed instability in the coalition formation in the experimental results. The
experimental results show that the instability is caused by the subjects with
low degrees of inequality-aversion rather than those with high degrees.
The estimation of Probit MLE(3) tests the factors included in the ques-
tionnaire and the previous results. 1400 observations were collected, except
for those in the rst round where each sub-treatment was with weakly dom-
inant strategies of joining. The internal constraint was violated 215 times.
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The result also supports a signicant positive e¤ect on the decision-making at
the last round. The e¤ect of (RELIGION) is rather insignicant in this test
and (POLITIC) instead has a negative e¤ect at the 5% signicance level. It
suggests that the pro-right-wingers violating the internal constraint is higher
than that of the pro-left-wingers
This result could be explained in the example of Group 9. Four out of
ve subjects in the group had a switch point in the inequality-averse test. For
example, Subject 44 had the highest degree of inequality-aversion - the switch
point was at p = 0:9. The switch point of subjects 43, 45 and 41 were 0:8, 0:8,
and 0:5 respectively. In the membership game, subject 44 violated the internal
constraint in only three out of 45 rounds. The violation rates of subjects 43,
45 and 41 are 3%, 0%, and 43%. It shows that the subjects with a higher
degree of inequality-aversion were less likely to violate the internal constraint.
However, the internal constraint could be broken by the subjects with a
higher degree of inequality-aversion in a few cases. Group 5 where everyone in
the group had a switch point in the inequality-averse test as a good example.
Subject 21 had the highest degree of inequality-aversion and the switch point
is at p = 0:9. Following that, the degree of subjects 22 and 24 is p = 0:8,
the degree of subject 25 is p = 0:7, and subject 23 is inequality-neutral - the
switch point is at p = 0:5. Subject 21 violates the internal constraint in 30%
of the 30 rounds, while the violation rates of subjects 22, 24, and 25 are 13%,
0%, and 3% respectively. In this case, the subjects with a higher degree of
inequality-aversion are more likely to act against the internal constraint.
The external constraint is assessed by the estimation of Probit MLE(4)
where the observationsweakly dominant strategy is not-to-join. The con-
straint was violated in 45% of the 1120 observations. When a coalition is
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unprotable, it is indi¤erent whether to join or not. Hence, the subjects would
make a random decision in the next round. This is the reason why the external
constraint was violated in almost half of the observations.
When a protable coalition was formed, 44% of the subjects would violate
the external constraint in the next round. If we only look at those subjects
with a higher degree of inequality-aversion (INEQ> 0:8), only 40% of them
violated the constraint. Turning to the results from those with a low degree
of inequality-aversion (INEQ< 0:5), the constraint was violated in almost half
of the observations. The result shows that the subjects with a high degree
of inequality-aversion were more likely to be free-riders. This might appear
to be counter-intuitive at rst sight, but the subjects with a low degree of
inequality-aversion have demonstrated di¤erent behaviour of forcing outsiders
to participate when their dominant strategy was to join a coalition. When
their roles changed to the opposite, they were more likely to compromise and
cooperate.
The estimation of Probit MLE(5) examines the factors from the question-
naire. In our hypothesis, the marginal benet of the total contribution () has
a signicant negative e¤ect on the decision. In contrast to the experimental
evidence of Burger and Kolstad (2010), our results do not support their earlier
nding that said that higher marginal benets would signicantly increase a
coalition size and consequently the total contribution. This is mainly because
our design limits any possible free-riding by excluding the subjects with high
marginal benet. This e¤ect is shown in the estimation of Probit MLE(1).
Despite the limitation of our design, the factor of the marginal benet in the
estimation of Probit MLE(5) is signicantly negative and corresponds to the
earlier ndings. Our study provides more detailed information, compared to
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the existing literature, about how potential free-riding benets would weaken
the incentives for participation. When the dominant strategy is not to join,
higher free-riding benet comes with higher marginal benet. The coalition
size was likely to be larger than the equilibrium size when the players are with
lower marginal benets.
Our results can be summarised as below
Summary 3
In terms of the coalition formation, the predictions with inequality-aversion
does not outperform those without.
In terms of the individual decisions when subjects could free-ride, those with
a higher marginal benet were less likely to join a coalition and prefer to have
a lower payo¤. On the other hand, the subjects with a high degree of religious
belief were more likely to be free-riders by not joining a coalition and having
higher payo¤.
Right-wingers are more likely to build a larger coalition when they could be
free-riders. Comparing to the results on the internal constraint, right-wingers
are more likely to violate both internal and external constraints. Right-wingers
tend to act strategicly by punishing and compromising when they are in di¤erent
roles.
1.4 Conclusions
This study has investigated the incentives to participate in IEAs with the
other-regarding preferences, particularly the preference of inequality-aversion.
The theory used in this study suggests that a stable coalition can be formed
both internally and externally, when the signatories have no incentive to leave
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and the nonsignatories have no incentive to join. The assumption of inequality-
averse preference argues that such a stable coalition would change by consid-
ering agentspreferences. Agents with a higher degree of inequality-aversion
are more likely to break the internal constraint and leave the coalition.
A two-part experiment has been conducted to validate this theory. The
rst part was a test to measure the individual attitude to inequality-aversion.
The second part was a public good game conducted to mimic the international
environmental convention. Subjects were given di¤erent payo¤ tables and
asked whether to join or not to join a coalition.
In order to fully capture individual behaviours in an IEA, the experiment
has been designed in such a way that teased out as much noise and as many
uncertainties as possible. In other words, the theoretical prediction for the
experiment was puried to a unique equilibrium. In contrast to the existing
literature, the results in this particular design do not support the theoretical
prediction that a higher marginal benet would signicantly enlarge a coalition
size and the total contribution. On the contrary, the subjects with a lower
degree of inequality-aversion are more likely to act strategicly by violating the
internal constraint. By doing so, they could force free-riders to participate.
But, when their role changes to the opposite, they reacted to compromise
their payo¤s.
Some other factors inquired in the questionnaire, such as the political
preference and religion preference, have also shown signicant e¤ects on the
decision-making. Pro-right-wingers behave as those with a lower degree of
inequality-aversion and make more strategic decisions.
Although it is di¢ cult to generalise solely based on one experiment which
has its own limitations in design and data collection, this study has provided
73
some promising results for understanding the real-world operation of IEAs, es-
pecially the dynamics that emerged during the decision making processes. One
rm conclusion is that, in order to stabilise a coalition internally, international
conventions had better emphasize the importance of fairness to signatories be-
cause a high degree of inequality-averse preference would lead a country to
participate. An IEA could be enlarged when nonsignatories were informed of
the potential damage if the target of the IEA cannot be achieved.
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Chapter 2
Altruism in a Climate Coalition
2.1 Introduction
Concerns about potential damages of climate change have grown dramatically
over the past decades. Threats and risks emerged from climate change can not
be combatted by individual sovereign nation states, actions to reduce green-
house gas emissions have to be taken at an international level. Several con-
clusions at the international conventions have been turned into international
environmental agreements (IEAs). Well known examples include the Montreal
Protocol in 1987 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.
A huge number of literature has explored the structures of and variations
of IEAs (Barrett, 1994 and 2001; Bahn et al., 2009; Weikard et al., 2006 and
Bratberg et al., 2005). Typically, these studies are based on the assumption
that agents pursue their self-interest, thereby the models used to investigate
IEAs are based on individual countriesexplicit welfare and ignore the e¤ects
of externalities. Results from these studies also show that the number of
signatories in an IEA decreases when the benet of global abatement increases.
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However, a growing number of experimental evidences has challenged such
rational self-interest (Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 2001 and Kolstad, 2014).
Altruistic behaviours and high degrees of cooperation are rather common in
experimental observations on public-good provision (Fischbacher et al., 2001).
For example, the theoretical work of Grüning and Peters (2010) suggests that
countriess abatements and level of participation in an IEA increase when the
countriess preferences incorporate justice and fairness. Hence, social (other-
regarding) preferences have become a non-neglectable factor in the studies of
IEAs.
In the previous chapter, inequality-averse preferences have been introduced
by examining the e¤ect of the diversity of individual payo¤s. The results in
Chapter 1 show that the degree of individual inequality-aversion is an impor-
tant variable to the decisions in an IEA membership game. Individuals care
not only about their own payo¤s but also the gaps between theirs and others
payo¤s. The diversity of individual payo¤s is a negative factor when agents
would like to approach a fair outcome.
In this chapter, I provide another approach of modelling other-regarding
preferences, which are agentsaltruistic behaviours in this case. Nagel (1970)
denes altruism as not abject self-sacrice, but merely a willingness to act in
the consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of ulterior
motives (1970, p. 79). Unlike the concept of inequality-aversion, altruistic
agents care about the overall welfare of all agents rather than the variance
of individual payo¤s. On the one hand, if fairness is the only goal of IEAs,
the result of a minimal variance of individual payo¤s may be meaningless if
everyone abates nothing and no IEA is formed. On the other hand, altruistic
agents might have a stronger incentive for participating in IEAs, if agents
76
would like to maximise the overall welfare by cooperating in the coalition.
The importance of altruistic preferences has been recognised in recent stud-
ies of IEAs. Van der Pol et al. (2012) consider altruism in the participation
decision of a two-stage IEA game. Two types of altruism are studied in their
paper: impartial altruism, where countries show a concern for all other coun-
tries, and community altruism, where the concern is extended only to coalition
partners. They claim that certain degree of altruism is su¢ cient to stabilise
a grand coalition. On the other hand, Hahn and Ritz (2014) relax the as-
sumption so that altruistic preferences may not reect directly on players
behaviour on the membership status. Their model allows strategic behaviours
that a player could behave di¤erent to her true preference. In this model, they
propose a hypothesis that a country almost always behaves less altruistically
than its true preference. Hahn and Ritz claim that it may be di¢ cult to infer
social preferences from this observed behaviour.
Both arguments of van der Pol et al. (ibid) and Hahn and Ritz (ibid) have
not been examined with empirical evidences. It is the goal of this study to
examine their model with experimental evidences and to provide a di¤erent
explanation.
Having said that, the aim of this chapter is to explore the e¤ects of altruistic
preferences on individual incentives of participating in an IEA. Specically, it
investigates how altruism may help individuals to overcome free-riding and join
an IEA. For this purpose, a model is built with agents who have di¤erent levels
of concerns about the overall payo¤ for all countries. Their individual altruistic
preferences a¤ect their decisions about whether they would like to join an
IEA or not. Having said that, this chapter does not explore the di¤erence of
individual payo¤s, but the sum of coalition payo¤s.
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The examination of the impacts of altruistic preferences is based on a novel
experimental design, which comprises two parts. The rst part is a test to
examine individualsdegrees of altruistic preferences. Subjects are asked to
answer a series of give-or-take questions. Their altruistic preferences are indi-
cated by how many times the subjects give away rewards to a stranger. The
second part of the experiment is a repeated one-shot public good game. Each
subject has di¤erent marginal benets of the total contribution to a public
good. This particular design provides better observations on individual be-
haviours than the previous design of identical marginal benets did.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, a model based on the
assumption of altruistic preferences is presented. A numerical example is pro-
vided to illustrate the impact of a high degree of altruistic preferences on the
coalition formation. In Section 3, an experiment with two parts is described
in detail to test the theory. The instructions are included in Appendix 1.4.
Section 4 shows the experimental outcomes and the data analyses. The con-
clusions are in the nal section.
2.2 The model
The framework is that of N heterogeneous countries, indexed k = 1; :::; N . A
country ks welfare is
k = ( xk) + kX
where the individual abatement xk is standardised between 0 (pollute) and 1
(abate), and k 2 [0; 1] is country ks individual marginal benet of the global
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abatement X, while X =
PN
k=1 xk.
Supposed that n countries (n 2 [2; N ]) decide to form a coalition. We
assume that countries are heterogeneous with respect to various marginal ben-
ets of the total abatement. We rank their marginal benets from high to
low as 1 > 2 > ::: > N . Since the main interest of this study is to exam-
ine the motivations for participation in an IEA, we simplify the situation to
a one-stage membership game by assuming that signatories would abate and
nonsignatories would pollute. If a protable coalition is formed, the members
in the coalition abate to maximise their joint payo¤. Their aggregate benet
of the total abatement is larger than the cost (
Pn
k=1 k > 1). Nonsignatories
would pollute while receiving a free-riding benet from the coalition. On the
other hand, if the coalition is unprotable, all countries would pollute and have
nothing for return.
The coalition payo¤
Q
is the sum of all signatoriespre-redistribution pay-
o¤s as
Y
=
nX
i=1
i
=
nX
i=1
[in  1]
where i is signatory is marginal benet of the total abatement.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the coalition members using transfers to equalise
net payo¤s between agents may be an inferior assumption in studying IEAs.
This mechanism suggests a less unequal distribution of payo¤s through trans-
ferring. Under this assumption, the countries with higher marginal benet of
the total abatement are more likely to leave the coalition, because those coun-
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tries could earn higher payo¤ for the absence. Because the coalition members
make a common decision and share the responsibility of maximising the coali-
tion payo¤, it is adequate to assume the coalition payo¤ is equally shared by
the members.
Hence, the post-redistribution payo¤ of a signatory i can be presented as
s =
nX
i=1
i   1 (2.1)
Since members in the coalition cooperate to abate, the payo¤ is the aggregate
payo¤ of signatories net of the cost of abatement. If the coalition is protable,
the payo¤ is positive.
The payo¤ of a nonsignatory j is
j = nj (2.2)
where j is a nonsignatory js marginal benet of the total abatement. Because
nonsignatories do not pay for abatement, each of them can enjoy the free-riding
benet, which is the size of the coalition times its own marginal benet.
Following Hahn and Ritz (2014), we build an altruism objective function
of a country k
Sk = (1  k) k + kW (2.3)
= k + k
X
k0 6=k
k0
where k 2 [0; 1]is country ks degree of altruistic preference, k is country
k welfare while W =
PN
k=1 k is the global welfare. It is intuitive to assume
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@Sk
@k
> 0, i.e. ks welfare is positively correlated with the magnitude of altruistic
preference. Besides, @Sk
@k0
 0 means that the higher the payo¤ of the other is,
the higher the welfare country k has. The function can be presented as the self-
interest payo¤of country k and its altruism concern about the aggregate payo¤
of other k0(all countries except k) countries. In other words, the objective of
this chapter is the sum of payo¤s rather than the variance of payo¤s.
The problem of the nonsignatory j is as follows:
The individual welfare of a signatory i is its own payo¤ and the adjusted
payo¤s from other countries. Hence, the maximising problem of a signatory i
is as follows:
maxSi =
8>><>>:
s + i
P
s0 6=s s0 if
Pn
i=1 i  1
0 if
Pn
i=1 i < 1
(2.4)
=
8>><>>:
(
Pn
i=1 i   1) + i
hPn 1
i0 6=i (
Pn
i=1 i   1) +
PN n
j
 
nj
i
if
Pn
i=1 i  1
0 if
Pn
i=1 i < 1
On the other hand, the welfare of a nonsignatory j depends on its own
payo¤ and the adjusted payo¤s from others. The problem of the nonsignatory
j is therefore as follows:
maxSj =
8>><>>:
j + j
P
j0 6=j j0 if
Pn
i=1 i  1
0 if
Pn
i=1 i < 1
(2.5)
=
8>><>>:
 
nj

+ j
hPn
i=1 (
Pn
i=1 i   1) +
PN n 1
j
 
nj
i
if
Pn
i=1 i  1
0 if
Pn
i=1 i < 1
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Given that n is the smallest protable coalition, if a signatory i decides
to join an IEA, the country follows the internal constraint as
Ssi (n
)  Snsi (n   1) (2.6)
Similar to the explanation in Chapter 1, the left-hand-side of the inequality
(2.6) is is welfare when it is a signatory in a n-member coalition. The right-
hand-side of the inequality is is welfare if it decides to be a nonsignatory and
the size of coalition becomes (n   1). Because the externality of abatement,
everyone is beneted by the abatement of a single country. When a country
decides to leave an IEA, all countries have to su¤er its absence with a de-
creasing abatement level. The gap between the objective of being a signatory
and that of being a nonsignatory is enlarged with a higher degree of altruistic
attitude. Therefore, the internal constraint becomes more robust when others
payo¤s are taken into account of the objective function.
If a nonsignatory j decides not to join an IEA, the country follows the
external constraint as
Snsj (n
)  Ssj (n + 1) (2.7)
The left-hand-side of the inequality (2.7) means js welfare when it is a
nonsignatory with an n-member coalition. The right-hand-side of the in-
equality is js welfare if it decides to become the (n + 1)-th member in the
coalition. Since the benet of abatement of being a signatory is enlarged with
a higher degree of altruistic attitude, the external constraint could be violated.
Given that all agents are self-interested, when the internal, the external
constraints and the unique equilibrium condition

1 + n >
PN
i=1 i

are all
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satised, we have learnt from Chapter 1 that there is a unique equilibrium
coalition. However, when the agents are with varying altruistic attitudes, the
unique equilibrium may not exist.
Conjecture 4
Depending on the individual degree of altruism, the size of a coalition could
be n or larger than n.
This conjecture is based on the possible outcomes shown in Appendix 2.1.
The internal constraint is always satised no matter to agents attitude to
altruism. The stronger attitude to altruism an agent has, the less likely the
agent would violate the internal constraint. This is due to the coalition is
designed to enhance the overall payo¤s. The utility of an altruist in a coalition
is higher than that of an egoist in the same coalition. On the other hand,
the external constraint could be violated if a nonsignatory has a high degree
of altruistic attitude. To sum up, the coalition size could be enlarged if a
subject has strong attitude to altruism. This conjecture will be tested by the
following experiment. When individual altruistic preferences are measured,
their individual decisions in the membership game and the coalition formation
could be predicted by this conjecture.
2.3 Experiment design
The experiment is incorporated into the game designed for Chapter 1. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the instructions (see the Appendix 1.3)
were provided on the subjectsdesks. The instructions consisted of three parts.
Since the purpose of this study was to investigate the impacts of altruistic
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preferences on the coalition formation, the data from part 2 and part 3 in the
instructions could satisfy our targeting.
Two-part design was used in this experiment. The rst part (Part 2 in the
instructions) provides the indicator of individual altruistic preferences. The
second part (Part 3 in the instructions) was a membership game in which
subjects were asked whether or not to join a coalition. Subject were given
di¤erent payo¤s for their decisions. The experiment in detail is illustrated as
follows.
Altruism test
The design of the altruism test renovates Bettinger and Slonim (2006)s and
Andreoni and Miller (2002)s experiments. In this test, subjects were paired
but without knowing each other beforehand. Each subject answered a series
of give-it-or-take-it decisions in 20 rounds. Their payo¤s were a¤ected by their
own decisions as well as their partners. In order to get unbiased data, the
subjects did not know the decisions made by their partners.
Each subject was given 1 token as an endowment. He or she (the dictator)
decided where the token would go to himself/herself or another subject (called
receiver, a random subject in the lab). All subjects were playing the role of
dictators. Though they were also receivers to their opponents, the payo¤s as
receivers were only released in the end of the experiment. The token for the
dictator was denoted as T1 1, and the number for the receiver was denoted as
(1  T1). The decision was made by the dictator, and the receiver could only
accept. The value of the token was di¤erent to the dictator and the receiver
1The token is indivisible, hence T1 is either 0 or 1.
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(z1 and z2 respectively). Hence, the payo¤ of the dictator was T1z1 and the
receivers was (1  T1) z2.
The welfare function of the dictator was
S1 = T1z1 + 1 (1  T1) z2
= T1 (z1   1z2) + 1z2
The dictator could keep the token when the level of altruism was as small
as 1 < z1z2 , otherwise the token would go to the receiver. The exchange rate
( z1
z2
) was descending over rounds. The highest level of altruism was assumed as
1 and altruistic neutrality was assumed as 0. The altruism level could be found
with the decreasing exchange rate over rounds. We can nd the approach value
by asking the subjects with 20 various sets of exchange rates. The possible
payo¤s set for subjects in the experiment is listed in Table 2.1. The payo¤s
in the left column are what a dictator had when she or he decided to keep the
token (Option 1). The payo¤s in the right column are what a receiver had
when the dictator decided to give the token (Option 2).
The expected decision in the rst round was to keep the token (Option 1).
Hence, T1 = 1 implies that the weight of individuals own payo¤ is higher than
that of other agentspayo¤s. When the same question repeats over rounds,
depending on individual altruistic attitudes, each agent would change their
minds from taking to giving the token at a particular round. After this round,
agents sacrice their own payo¤s to benet others without being able to ask
for any reward. Thus the altruism level  can be inferred.
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Round z1 z2 (z1z2 )
1 £ 1 £ 1 1
2 £ 10 £ 10:5 0:95
3 £ 7:5 £ 8 0:94
4 £ 5 £ 5:5 0:91
5 £ 2:5 £ 3 0:83
6 £ 7:5 £ 10 0:75
7 £ 5 £ 7:5 0:67
8 £ 0:5 £ 1 0:5
9 £ 5 £ 10:5 0:48
10 £ 2:5 £ 5:5 0:46
11 £ 1 £ 2:5 0:4
12 £ 2:5 £ 7:5 0:33
13 £ 2:5 £ 10 0:25
14 £ 0:5 £ 2:5 0:2
15 £ 1 £ 5:5 0:18
16 £ 1 £ 7:5 0:13
17 £ 0:5 £ 5 0:1
18 £ 1 £ 10:5 0:095
19 £ 0:5 £ 7:5 0:07
20 £ 0:5 £ 10 0:05
Table 2.1: List of values of the token and exchange rate
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Experiment of a coalition game
This part is a joint experiment with Chapter 1 and the design of the experiment
has been illustrated in detail in the previous chapter. The summary of the
coalition game is as follows. The subjects were randomly assigned to groups
of ve subjects. They did not know who they are playing with, but they knew
that they were playing with the same people during the whole session. Tables
were provided with the individual payo¤s of all possible coalition combinations.
They did not know othersdecisions until everyone made their decisions. The
history of the membership status and payo¤s of all subjects in the group were
revealed on their screen at the end of each round.
The results are reported as follows.
2.4 Experimental results and analyses
In the altruism test, a selsh and rational subject would always decide to take
(Option 1) for 20 rounds. On the other hand, an altruistic subject would decide
to give (Option 2) at round 20 for sure. The higher the degree of altruistic
preference a subject has, the more likely the subject would choose Option 2.
Since the ratio of exchange rate (z1
z2
) has been ranked in the order from high
to low, this order indicates the level of altruistic preference at the switching
point where an altruistic subject alters her or his decision from Option 1 to
Option 2. The table in Appendix 2.2 shows the result of the altruism test of
all subjects.
Figure 2.1 shows the e¤ect of altruism. It is perhaps unsurprising that all
subjects decided to keep the token in the rst round. However, the smaller
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Figure 2.1: Number of subjects taking Option 1in each round
the ratio of the exchange rate was, the more likely the subjects gave up the
token. In the last round, almost 60% of subjects gave up £ 0:5 and made an
unknown partner earning £ 10. The remaining 18 subjects could be considered
as egoists, because they chose Option 1 throughout.
The majority of the subjects had altruistic preferences, as we observed
them giving up their allowances to benet unknown partners. 13 of them had
consistent behaviour with one switching point from Option 1 to Option 2. In
general, a decreasing trend in Figure 2.1 shows that the degree of the subjects
altruistic preferences is heterogeneous.
In addition, it is also interesting that the value of the token is an important
factor to the subjectsdecision-making. When the opportunity cost of giving
was £ 0:5 in rounds 8, 14, and 17, the subjects were more likely to behave
altruistically. Compared to the results in the next rounds (rounds 9, 15, and
18), the number of taking Option 1was lower even when the ratio of exchange
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Variable
Altruism level
OLS Regression
Constant term
 9:17
(20:17)
AGE
0:005
(0:01)
POLITIC
0:03
(0:05)
RELIGION
 0:06
(0:03)
Log Likelihood  10:4767 R-squared 0:07
Total Observation 50
Note: Each cell contains coe¢ cient and standard error in parenthesis
 means 10% signicant level
Table 2.2: OLS estimation of altruistic preference
rate was higher in rounds 8, 14, and 17.
Table 2.2 shows the OLS estimation of altruistic preference. The dependent
variable is the average times of taking the Option 1 in the inequality-averse
test. Independent variables are the subjectsage (AGE), political attitude
(POLITIC), and religious attitude (RELIGION). At a 10% signicance level,
the impact of religious attitude is negative. This interesting result implies that
the subjects who identied themselves with stronger religious belief behaved
less altruistically. Later, the factor of religious attitude also has a signicant
e¤ect on the membership decisions. This striking result contradicts our intu-
ition that many religious believers are volunteers doing charity work. The rest
factors have insignicant impacts on the subjectsaltruistic attitudes.
The results on the coalition game have been reported in Chapter 1. There
is no need to repeat them again here. This chapter analyses the impact of al-
truistic preferences on the coalition formation with two methods. Firstly, the
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predicted coalition formation with altruistic preferences is generated. Com-
paring to the prediction with a self-interested preference, the predictions with
altruistic preferences are more closed to the actual total contributions. Sec-
ondly, the factors which may inuence the subjectsdecisions on a public good
game are examined byMaximum Likelihood Estimation(MLE) of binary probit
regressions. In addition, a comparison of the results with those of inequality-
aversion assumption in Chapter 1 helps our understanding of the impacts of
di¤erent social preferences.
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By using the data of individual altruistic preferences in the altruism test
and the historical records of the decisions in the coalition-game experiment,
a predicted coalition formation with the altruistic preferences is generated.
To benchmark this prediction, a self-interested prediction is generated with
the historical records of the decisions in the coalition game only. Figure 2.2
presents the total contribution of Groups 1 to 4. The blue solid line in each
chart presents the actual total contribution in a sub-treatment. Given the
historical outcomes in the past round and the subjects individual altruistic
preferences, the altruistic predictions of the coalition formation are generated
as the red short dashed line with cross. In order to examine the precision
and robustness of our model for measuring the e¤ect of altruistic attitude,
the predictions which are generated with historical data only are shown as
the green dash line with triangle marks. The predictions are called the self-
interested predictions. The actual total contribution and the predicted total
contribution of Groups 5 to 10 are shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
Both predictions are higher than the actual total contribution in general.
Compared to the self-interested predictions, the predictions which consider
the altruistic attitude is closer to the actual total contribution in most cases.
Moreover, the variance of the predictions with altruistic attitude is usually
higher than that of the self-interested predictions.
When we examine the individual decisions, the predictions with individual
altruistic attitudes match the actual decisions by 2074 over 2800 observations
(74:1%). The predictions are slightly better than the self-interested predictions
which match the actual decision by 73:6%. When the subjects dominant
strategy is to join the coalition, over the 1540 observations, the predictions
with altruistic attitude match the actual decisions by 84:9%. The performance
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Figure 2.3: Actual total contribution and predicted total contribution with
and without altruistic preferences of Groups 5 to 7
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Figure 2.4: Actual total contribution and predicted total contribution with
and without altruistic preferences of Groups 8 to 10
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of the self-interested predictions is at the same matching rate. On the other
hand, when the subjects dominant strategy is not to join the coalition, over
the 1260 observations, the predictions with altruistic attitude match by 60:8%
and the self-interested predictions had slightly lower rate by 59:7%.
In order to investigate the impact of altruistic preferences on the individual
decisions, Maximum Likelihood Estimation(MLE) of binary probit estimations
are reported in Table 2.3. The variables are the decision made at the last
round (DECISION( 1)), the average number choosing takein the altruism
test (ALTRU), the year subjects were born (AGE), the political preference
from left (1) to right (5) (POLITIC), the religion preference from atheist (1)
to religionist (5) (RELIGION), the weakly dominant strategy from not joining
(0) to joining (1) (WD STRATEGY), the parameter of marginal benet of
total contribution () and the total contribution of the group at the last round
(TC ( 1)).
The regression of Probit MLE(1) employs all observations with a total of
3000 individual decisions from the coalition game. Since two variables (DE-
CISION ( 1) and TC ( 1)) depend on the outcomes at the last round, 2800
observations are used for the regression. The subjects decide to join in 1884
times and not to join in 916 times. The decision at the past round and the
weakly dominant strategy have a positive e¤ect on the decision at the 1% sig-
nicance level. It means when joining is either the decision made in the past
round or the subjects weakly dominant strategy, the subject is more likely
to join. Meanwhile, the amount of the total contribution at the past round
(TC( 1)) has an insignicant e¤ect. For the factors from the questionnaire,
the factors of AGE and POLITIC are statistically insignicant while the factor
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Variable
Probit
MLE(1)
Probit
MLE(2)
Probit
MLE(3)
Probit
MLE(4)
Probit
MLE(5)
Constant term
-4.22
(11.74)
0.98***
(0.09)
-9.01
(20.12)
-0.27***
(0.09)
0.34
(17.30)
DECISION ( 1) 1.12
***
(0.07)
1.28***
(0.12)
0.98***
(0.08)
ALTRU
0.13
(0.09)
0.10
(0.12)
0.16
(0.14)
0.25**
(0.11)
0.01
(0.13)
AGE
0.002
(0.006)
0.005
(0.01)
-0.0002
(0.009)
POLITIC
0.04
(0.03)
-0.11**
(0.05)
0.16***
(0.04)
RELIGION
-0.04*
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
-0.10***
(0.03)
WD STRATEGY
1.14***
(0.09)

-1.12***
(0.24)
-5.21***
(1.05)
TC ( 1) -0.07
(0.11)
-0.19
(0.20)
-0.14
(0.14)
Log Likelihood -1321.26 -683.96 -568.88 -930.17 -737.33
Total Observation 2800 1650 1540 1350 1260
Observation with
Membership=1
1884 1410 1308 629 576
Note: Each cell contains coe¢ cient and standard error in parenthesis.
, ,  are signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Table 2.3: Probit estimations of probability of joining a coalition
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of RELIGION has negative impact. It implies that the stronger religious belief
a subject has, the less likely to join the IEA. As we mentioned earlier, the reli-
gious attitude also inuences the subjectsaltruistic preferences. This will lead
to the factor of altruistic attitude has insignicant e¤ect on the membership
decision.
The data can be divided into two groups: a group of observations where
subjectsdominant strategy is joining the coalition and another group where
subjectsdominant strategy is not to join. In other words, the internal con-
straint is examined by the regression of Probit MLE(2). There are 1650 ob-
servations which are with the weakly dominant strategy to join the coalition.
The internal constraint is not satised 240 times. The result does not show a
signicant impact of altruistic preferences on individual decisions.
On the other hand, the external constraint is examined by the regression
of Probit MLE(4). There are 1350 observations which are with the weakly
dominant strategy not to join the coalition. The external constraint is not
satised in 629 times. Interestingly, at the 5% signicance level, the lower the
degree of altruistic preference a subject has, the more likely the subject is to
violate the external constraint and participate in the coalition. The subjects
behaviour is in contrast to the self-interested prediction as well as our intuition.
This could be explained in the example of group 5. Four of ve subjects
in the group have a switching point in the altruism test. Subject 24 has the
highest degree of altruism since this subject has given away the token from
an early round. Subjects 21, 23, and 25 have changed their minds at rounds
4, 17 and 19 respectively. Subject 22 has two switch points at rounds 5 and
8. In the membership game, subject 24 with a high degree of altruism only
violates the external constraint in 1 of 15 rounds, while subject 23 who has low
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altruistic attitude violates the external constraint at 47% of 30 observations.
However, the altruistic prediction happens in some cases. For example,
subject 25 with a low degree of altruism violates the external constraint in
only 3 of the 30 rounds. Subjects 21 and 22 have a high degree of altruism
and violate the constraint in 63% and 57% of 30 rounds, respectively.
Having said that, even the subjects with similar degrees of altruism behave
di¤erently in the coalition game. For example, the subjects in groups 8 and
9 keep the token throughout 20 rounds. It implies that they all have a very
low degree of altruism. However, in the coalition game, the subjects in group
8 form a protable coalition in 12 of 60 rounds but the subjects in group 9
form a protable coalition in 42 over 60 rounds. Subjects 38, 42 and 43 are
not bound with the external constraint over 50% of the rounds where they are
better not to join the coalition.
The regressions of Probit MLE(3) and Probit MLE(5) assess other factors
which might inuence subjectsdecisions. The factor of the decisions in the
past round is positive at 1% signicant level. It means their preferences are
rather consistent.
The marginal benet of total contribution () in the regression of Probit
MLE (5) has the negative e¤ect on the decision at the 1% signicance level.
It it intuitive that the higher the free-riding benet a subject has, the less
likely it is that the subject would like to contribute to a public good. Other
variables, the total contribution in the past round and the age of subjects, are
insignicant factors.
Subjects are playing a more complicated strategy to cooperate with each
other. Compared to the outcomes which exclude the observations in the rst
round, subjects are more likely to cooperate at the rst round in each sub-
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treatment when they do not know the decisions of each other. In 200 ob-
servations collected from the rst round of each sub-treatment, the internal
constraint held at more than 90% of 110 observations while the external con-
straint is violated in almost 60% (53 out of 90 observations). On the other
hand, such high cooperation rates decrease after seeing other subjectsdeci-
sions. The internal constraint is satised in 85% of 1540 observations and the
external constraint is violated in 46% of 1260 observations.
Other interesting variables include the political preferences. When subjects
are better o¤ to cooperate, pro-right-wing supporters are more likely to break
the internal constraint by not joining the coalition. However, when the subjects
have the chance to free ride, pro-right-wingers are more likely to give up this
chance. It seems that right-wingers are more strategic by using punishing and
cooperating to increase the overall welfare. In addition, it is interesting that
the subjects who consider themselves to have a high degree of religious belief
are less likely to give up the chance of free-riding.
2.4.1 Comparison of results for altruistic and inequality-
averse preferences
Compared to the results in Chapter 1, the model with altruistic preferences
performs better than that with inequality-averse preferences. In terms of the
individual social preferences and the membership status in the past round,
the predictions on the individual membership decisions are generated. When
the subjectsweakly dominant strategy is to join the coalition, over the 1540
observations, the predictions with altruistic preferences match 84:9% of the ac-
tual decisions while the predictions with inequality-averse preferences match
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77:2%. Meanwhile, the predictions with no other-regarding preferences per-
form as good as the predictions with altruistic preferences.
On the other hand, when the subjectsweakly dominant strategy is not to
join the coalition, over the 1260 observations, the predictions with altruistic
preferences matches 60:8% of the actual decisions while the the predictions
with inequality-averse preferences match by 51:5%. Overall, the performance
of the predictions with altruistic attitude is superior than those with inequality-
averse preferences.
In terms of results of the probit regressions, the degree of altruistic prefer-
ence is an signicant negative factor to the probability of joining a coalition.
Especially when subjects have the chance to free-ride, the lower the altruistic
preferences a subject has, the more likely it is that the subject would cooperate.
Similarly, the impact of the degree of inequality-averse preference is di¤erent
to our expectation. The higher degree of inequality-aversion a subject has, the
subject is more likely to cooperate where the expected decision is not to join
the coalition. It seems that the social preferences may not show directly as
the behaviour in an interactive game.
The experimental evidences in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 show the
strategic behaviour in the public good game. Hahn and Ritz (2014) also claim
that it may be di¢ cult to infer countriestrue preferences for altruism from
their observed behaviour. The challenge to the further studies and policy mak-
ers on climate negotiations is to nd out the linkage between the preferences
and the behaviour.
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2.5 Conclusions
This chapter examines the impact of altruistic preferences on the formation
of IEAs. Existing experimental literature (such as Fischbacher et al., 2001)
suggests that subjects often behave altruistically in a public good game. To
test this, a particular model is built with individual altruistic attitudes. The
theoretical result shows that agents who have a higher degree of altruistic
preferences are more likely to cooperate. If an agent with a high degree of
altruistic preference plays, there may exist a larger coalition than the Nash
prediction.
In order to examine the model, a two-part experiment was designed and
run. In the rst part, the altruism test questioned if subjects would give
away their benets to an unknown partner or not. Their altruistic preferences
were indicated with the number of rounds, in which they sacrice without any
reward. Following this, subjects are asked to play a public good game.
The data on individual altruistic preferences provides valuable information
that about half of the subjects have di¤erent degrees of altruistic preferences.
Two type of predictions are generated: the rst one uses the historical records
of the individual decisions in the membership game and the individual altru-
istic attitudes; the second type uses the historical records only. Both type of
predictions are higher than the actual total contribution in general. Compare
to the neutral predictions, the predictions which consider the altruistic atti-
tude is closer to the actual total contribution in the most cases. Moreover, the
variance of the predictions with altruistic attitude is usually higher than that
of the neutral predictions.
Compared to the actual individual decisions, the predictions with indi-
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vidual altruistic attitudes have better performance than the self-interested
predictions. When subjects dominant strategy is to join the coalition, the
predictions with altruistic attitude perform same to the self-interested predic-
tions. On the other hand, when subjects dominant strategy is not to join the
coalition, the predictions with altruistic attitude are slightly superior to the
self-interested predictions.
The estimations illustrate the subjectsmotivations. The rate of coopera-
tion in a coalition game seems to be negatively correlated with the magnitude
of altruistic preferences: the lower the degree of altruistic preference, the more
is the cooperation. This is particularly so when the subjectsweakly dominant
strategies are not to join a coalition.
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Chapter 3
Sustainability and International
Environmental Agreements
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the relation between perceptions of sustainability and
the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a cross-
generational model with a two-stage game in two periods.
Human activities have left many enduring footprints and legacies. As a
result, the ecosystems on the Earth have changed dramatically due to the rapid
industrial development in the past decades. Our society is now facing a range
of environmental crises. Actions are urged to maintain basic needs of the future
generations, because the outcome of human development is often irreversible
and will be passed on to the next generations. Some of the environmental
problems can be addressed at the national level. As an e¤ective supra-national
governmental authority that can handle cross-border environmental issues has
not yet existed, IEAs have served as the second-best solution.
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The most common purpose of the existing IEAs is to assure sustainable de-
velopment. The term sustainable developmentwas rst used in the report of
Our Common Future which was published by the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development (WCED) in 1987. In that publication, it is dened
as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
Lately, sustainability or sustainable development have become buzz-
words overloaded with fuzzy meanings. At the discussion of IEAs, stake-
holders such as governments, industries, NGOs, trade unions, academics all
have di¤erent understandings of sustainability. For instance, the objective
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
in 1992 declared ... Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame
su¢ cient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure
that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to
proceed in a sustainable manner (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 4). Later in 1997, the
UNFCCC stated in the Kyoto Protocol that Each Party included in Annex
I, in achieving its quantied emissions limitation and reduction commitments
under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable development (Kyoto Protocol,
1997, Article 2).
The report of Our Common Future links sustainability with poverty erad-
ication, equitable distribution of benets derived from natural resources, pop-
ulation policies, development of human activities and maintenance of natural
resources. Although e¤orts have been endeavoured to construct a common
standard between di¤erent international bodies, and negotiation has been un-
dergoing to reduce the distance between the representatives and the repre-
sented, there still exists an epistemic gap in various perceptions and interpre-
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tations of sustainability. This is especially the case when one considers the
tension between future generations and democracy (social diversity or di¤erent
cultures, intrinsic values or resources for local problems, mute actors, multi-
ple representations, di¤erent issues, may they be techno-centred, eco-centred,
anthropo-centred). All these factors shape individual decision-makings and
contribute to dynamics, and stability of an IEA.
To explore how these di¤erent understandings of sustainabilityshape in-
dividual decisions and incentives to join (or not to join) an IEA, this paper
will focus on individual concerns about the future generations.
Based on a literature review, the concept of sustainability can be cate-
gorised at three levels: individual, societal, and the ecosystem levels.
To individuals, sustainability usually means to achieve constant utility
(Solow, 1974 and Hartwich, 1977) and avoid any decline in utility (Pearce
et al. 1989; Pezzey, 1997). More precisely, Pezzey (ibid) identies three dis-
tinct constraints: sustainable level, sustained level, and survivable level. Here,
utility is the objective for individuals to achieve sustainability.
To society, sustainability is when the basic needs of the future generations
are satised (WCED, 1987); the length of the existence of the human race is
maximised (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971); the present value of the social welfare is
not declining (Riley, 1980); and the per capita incomes of the future generations
are no worse o¤ (Pearce et al, 1989 ). The indicators of sustainability at
this level are the theoretical social welfare and the practical gures (such as
Green Net National Product expanded by Hartwick, 1977 and Genuine Savings
provided by Hamilton and Clemens, 1999).
Moving to the ecosystem, sustainability covers a wide range of objectives
which include exhaustible natural resources (Meadows et al, 1972), renewable
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natural resources, production waste, and biological diversity. In order to meet
sustainability, exhaustible resources, such as minerals and fossil fuel deposits,
have to be extracted at a rate at which the length of use is maximised. Renew-
able resources, such as sheries and forests, have to be harvested at a natural
and manageable speed of regeneration. In addition, biological diversity also
has to be maintained for the basic need of the survival development.
The previous studies have proposed three types of policy goals for sus-
tainability: (1) achieving constant or non-declining individual utility function
(Solow, 1974 and Pezzy, 1997); (2) avoiding any decline in social values from
the present time onwards (Riley, 1980); and (3) maintaining existing safe
minimum standards(Toman, 1994). These can be applied onto management
of natural exhaustible resources and renewable resources and waste emissions
(Solow, 1974 and Stiglitz, 1974).
In order to avoid any decline in social present value, Woodward (2000)
identies a set of behaviours that would lead to sustainable life; these behav-
iours entail intergenerational fairness. This means that the future generations
will not envy the present one, and there exists an alternative, feasible choice
that there is no envy between generations. Woodwards ethical assumption
emphasises the current generations responsibility to future generations. That
said, the current generation has to consider not only their present welfare but
also the welfare of future generations. Woodwards concept of sustainability
emphasises the fairness across generations.
Toman (1994) discusses the concept of safe minimum standard when
speaking of strong sustainability. Because human activities in natural envi-
ronments have irreversiblee¤ect, the human capital can not substitute the
natural assets when decision makers have low level of information but high
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potential asymmetry in the payo¤. Hence, Barbier and Markandya (1990) im-
pose a minimum stock of environmental assets. In this model, when the asset
is driven below this safety criterion, environmental degradation will destroy
the natural clean-up and regenerative processes in the environment. Following
this concept, Martinet (2011) proposes an approach that denes the objectives
of sustainability using sustainability threshold indicators.
Though the concept of sustainability is so important to IEAs, relatively
few attention has been paid to discuss the relationship between this key factor
and the formation of IEAs. The majority of theoretical studies employs static
models to analyse the coalition formation (e.g. Barrett, 1994, 2005; Yi, 1997
and Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998). These models ignore the importance of
sustainability and simply assume that humans are immortal because there
exists a static optimal pollution level where humans welfare is maximised.
However, these static models do not reect the reality to illustrate the im-
pact of sustainability which emphasises the fairness between generations. The
present generation thinks and behaves di¤erently from future generations, even
though they might care the future generation. Recent studies (e.g. Germain
et al. 2003; de Zeeuw, 2008; Rubio and Ulph, 2007) have employed some more
dynamic models to describe human development in the innite horizon. How-
ever, this setting still presumes that future generations are always richer than
the present generation in terms of welfare, hence exclude the possibility of de-
creasing welfare. That said, the cross-generational fairness is hardly considered
in the literature. To our best knowledge, this study is the rst to consider the
impact of sustainability (more specically the impact of diverse perceptions
of sustainability) in the formation of IEAs. In order to model the impacts
of di¤erent perceptions of sustainability, the value of the social welfare of the
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future generation has to be taken into account when reviewing the present
generations welfare and decision-making. Additionally, the non-declining so-
cial welfare also needs to be reconsidered. The sustainability criterion dictates
that the social welfare of the future generation should not be worse than that
of the present generation.
This chapter builds a two-stage game in two periods. In each period, the
decision makers are di¤erent agents. They decide whether or not to participate
in an IEA in the rst stage. In terms of their membership status, countries
will decide the emissions level in the second stage. We consider two scenar-
ios for the objective function in Period 1. To examine the e¤ect of di¤erent
perceptions of sustainability on the formation of IEAs, a myopic (MYO) sce-
nario is rst proposed. In the MYO scenario, the decision makers of the old
generation care about their own welfare. Following, we consider the model in
the sustainable development (SD) scenario that the decision makers of the old
generation care about that of the young generation. The old generation at-
tempts to maximise the over-generational welfare and ensure that the welfare
of the young generation is no worse o¤ than the young one.
Our result shows that the marginal cost of the total emissions plays an
important role. The higher the marginal cost is, the lower the individual emis-
sions level. A grand coalition formation is possibly formed when the marginal
cost is very small. Besides, the awareness of sustainability have small but
ambiguous impact on the formation in two periods.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section two, a two-stage game in
two periods model is built in two scenarios. A numerical example presented
in Section three illustrate the coalition formation in di¤erent scenarios. The
conclusion and discussion are in the nal section.
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3.2 The model
Unlike Chapters 1 and 2, this chapter investigates the cross-generational pref-
erences based on a model that focuses on the frameworks of IEAs and ignore
individualities. This assumption of identical countries is drawn on Barrett
(1994), Rubio and Ulph (2007) and Breton et al. (2010) which assume coun-
tries are homogeneous in their analyses of incentives of participating in IEAs.
We appreciate to the assumption of heterogeneous players, however, we have
emphasised the point in the introduction: to our best understanding, there
is no paper which model sustainability in the discussion of the formation of
IEAs.
In order to investigate the long term e¤ect of pollution, we present a model
of a two-stage game in two periods. Table 3.1 shows the decision process of
the model. The decision makers live for one period only: the old generation
lives in Period 1 and the young generation lives in Period 2. In each period,
there is a two-stage game: in the rst stage membership game, the countries
decide whether or not to participate in an IEA. In the second stage emission
game, countries make the decision on the level of emissions in terms of their
membership status. Nonsignatories choose emissions in a non-cooperative way
to maximise their own payo¤, while signatories act as one to maximise the
coalition payo¤. The emission plan is irreversible, but the total stock of emis-
sions will accumulate with a certain decay rate. Hence, the total stock of
emissions is the sum of the accumulated emissions from the past and the ag-
gregated emissions in that period. In order to understand the importance of
sustainability in IEAs, the focus of this study is on the coalition formation in
two scenarios. The young generation have the same objective function in both
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Time
horizon
Period 1 Period 2
Player Old generation Young generation
2-stage game
Membership
game
Emission
game
Membership
game
Emission
game
Total emission E1= E0+
n1P
i=1
ei:1+
NP
j=n1+1
ej:1 E2= E1+
n2P
i=1
ei:2+
NP
j=n2+1
ej:2
Objective function
(MYO scenario)
Nonsignatory : j;1
Signatory : 1
Nonsignatory : j;2
Signatory : 2
Objective function
(SD scenario)
Nonsignatory :
j;1 + 
f
j;2
s.t. j;1  fj;2
Signatory : 1 + 
f
2
s.t. 1  f2
Nonsignatory : j;2
Signatory : 2
Table 3.1: The decision process of the model
scenario, however, the old generation have di¤erent objective functions. While
countries concern about only the welfare of the old generation in the MYO
scenario, countries in the SD scenario concern about not only the welfare of
the old generation but also that of the young generation. In addition, the
welfare of the young generation is required to be no worse than that of the old
generation.
There is a nite set of N identical countries. While there obviously are
other capital stock variables in abatement (e.g. non-fossil power stations),
we only consider the stock of pollutant in the model. The pollutant is a by-
product of production, the stock of pollutant has a strong positive correlation
with industrial processes. The normalised benet function from the production
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can be presented as
B (ek;t) =
1
b
ebk;t
where ek;t denotes a country k in Period t has to choose a level of emissions,
k 2 f1; :::; Ng and t 2 f1; 2g 1. The parameter b is the benet elasticity
of emission where b 2 (0; 1). This assumption of a concave benet function
implies the diminishing rate of returns. It says that as additional units of
emissions are generated, eventually the marginal benet from the production
will decrease. It should be noted that the benet elasticity of emission b is a
constant and determined by available technology level, or management of the
production process. Higher benet elasticity by advanced technology implies a
country has a higher benet per unit of emissions. This elasticity measures the
responsiveness of benet to a change in level of emissions stock. For example,
when b = 0:5, a 1% increase in emissions stock would lead to approximately
0:5% increase in benet.
While the pollutant also causes severe damage to the environment, the
cost for country k is highly correlated with the global stock of emissions. The
damage cost function for k is a linear function denoted as
C (Et) = Et
where  is the marginal cost of the total stock of emissions Et where  > 0. The
total stock of emissions contains the accumulated emissions from the past and
1Each country chooses a level of emissions for the production, we do not have a particu-
larly reason to normalise the level to 1.
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the aggregate emissions generated by the signatories and the nonsignatories
Et  Et 1 +
nX
i=1
ei:t +
NX
j=n+1
ej:t (3.1)
Suppose n of N countries2 join an IEA and the rest are nonsignatories. We
dene ei;t  0; i = 1; :::; n and t = 1; 2, as the individual emissions of a
signatory i in Period t. By controlling an equal amount of emissions in each
signatory, the optimal coalition payo¤ can be reached. On the other hand, ej;t;
j = n+1; :::; N and t = 1; 2, denotes the individual emissions of a nonsignatory
j in Period t.
Hence, (3.1) can be read as the total stock of emissions is the sum of
the accumulated emissions from the past, the emissions from signatories and
the emissions from nonsignatories in the current period. The accumulated
emissions from the past depends on the natural decay factor per period  2
(0; 1). Because Greenhouse gas (GHG) stock is absorbed naturally over time,
the total pollution decays over time. It is reasonable to assume that the decay
rate is between zero and one. Because the stock of emissions is accumulative,
the decision on emissions which is generated by the old generation a¤ects to
not only the old generation but also the young generation.
We assume that all countries decide their emissions plan simultaneously.
In period t, a country ks net benet function is
k;t = B (ek;t)  C (Et)
Each generation lives for one period and optimises the welfare with respect
2n is an integer value between 0 and N .
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to its current level of emissions as
max
ek;t
k;t =

1
b
ebk;t   Et

(3.2)
As mentioned previously, given the initial stock of the pollutant, there is a
two-stage games:
 In the rst stage, countries decide whether or not to join an IEA.
 In the second stage, countries decide their emission in terms of their
membership status.
 Signatories move as one by determining a common emissions level
to maximise the coalition welfare.
Nonsignatories decide their own emissions level to maximise their
own individual welfare.
When we discuss the formation of self-enforcing IEAs, following Rubio and
Ulph (2007), the membership of any country is determined by a random process
such that the probability of any country being a signatory in that period is
simply the membership of the stable IEA in that period divided by the total
number of countries. This probability is the same for all countries, but the
membership of countries in di¤erent periods could be di¤erent. Two scenarios
in the decision process have been shown in Table (3.1): (i) myopic (MYO), (ii)
sustainable development (SD). The young generation faces the same objective
function, while the old generation have di¤erent policy goals in both scenarios.
In the MYO scenario, the old generation is myopic and the decision makers only
concern their own welfare in Period 1. In the SD scenario, the old generation
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concerns not only its own welfare but also the expected welfare of the young
generation. Besides, the sustainability criterion dictates that the welfare of
the young generation cannot be worse than the welfare of the old generation.
We would like to highlight that for the SD scenario the expected welfare of
the young generation is based on the membership status of the old generation.
In Period 1, the old decision makers have the expectation and belief about the
membership of the young generation when they consider the cross-generational
welfare. This assumption is adequate because practical IEAs do not usually
have an expire date3. The young generation is expected to inherit the mem-
bership from the old generation. However, in Period 2, the membership status
of the young generation does not necessary be the same to that of the old one.
In other words, the coalition formation could be di¤erent in both periods4.
We solve the two-stage and two-period game by backward induction. Sec-
tion 3.2.1 discusses the young generations decisions on the two-stage game
which includes the emission plan and the membership status in Period 2. Then
we discuss the old generations decisions on the two-stage game in Period 1.
There are two scenarios: Section 3.2.2 discusses the myopic scenario where the
old generation cares about its welfare; Section 3.2.3 discusses the sustainable
development scenario where the old generation cares not only its welfare but
also the young generations.
3For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in
1987.
4For example, the Kyoto Protocol has two commitments periods. The rst commitment
period applies to emissions between 2008-2012, and the second commitment period applies
to emissions between 2013-2020. Only 37 parties have stated to participate in the second
commitment period. Others (e.g. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) may withdraw from
the Protocol or not put into legal force the Amendment with second round targets.
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3.2.1 Decisions in Period 2
Second-stage emissions game
Regardless of the decision makers are myopic or not, the young generation
faces the same decision process. Suppose that n2 countries has decided to
participate in the coalition in Period 2, so that the rest (N   n2) countries are
nonsignatories. From (3.2), a young nonsignatory j maximises its objective
function that its individual payo¤s
max
ej;2
j;2 =

1
b
ebj;2   E2

(3.3)
where ej;2 is the emissions level of a nonsignatory j in Period 2. The total
emissions E2 = E1 +
n2P
i=1
ei:2 +
NP
j=n2+1
ej:2 is the sum of the accumulated
stock of emissions in the past period with the decay rate  and the aggregated
emissions from signatories and nonsignatories in Period 2.
The optimal level of emissions of a young nonsignatory is
ej;2 = ()
 1
1 b (3.4)
Since the parameter b is set between 0 and 1, we therefore learn that a
higher marginal cost of the total emissions ( > 1) leads to a lower optimal
emissions level (@ej;2
@
< 0). The derivative with respect to the parameter b
of the emissions level (@ej;2=@b) is ambiguous 5. When the marginal cost of
5A simple proof is below:
(1) take logarithms of both side ln (e) =  11 b ln ()
(2) take the derivative with respect to b, @ ln(e)@e
@e
@b =
  ln()
(1 b)2
So @e@b is positive when  is less than 1 and it is negative when  is greater than 1 .
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total emissions is smaller than 1, it implies that the higher technology level
may incur more pollution. In light of the history of human development, the
more advanced technology we have, the more we would like to produce. While
the technologies are more e¢ cient and produce fewer pollutants per unit of
product, the level of emissions increases due to the increasing consumption of
products. In other words, the advanced level of technology development may
lead to a more e¢ cient production per unit of emission, but it also encourage
countries to emit more in total. On the other hand, when the marginal cost of
total emissions  is greater than 1, the more advanced technology would lower
the emissions level. This is due to when the marginal cost is high, the increase
on the pollution cost is faster than the growth of benet by the technology
development.
The emissions level of a signatory i is determined when the coalition payo¤
is optimised with regard to the common emissions level ei;2, 8i 2 1; :::; n2
max
ei;2
2 =
nX
i

1
b
ebi;2   E2

(3.5)
All signatories make a common decision to maximise the coalition payo¤.
If the number of the coalition is n2, the coalition emissions is n2 times of a
signatory is emissions level. It is presented as @Et
@ei;t
= n2. This group e¤ect
implies that having more signatories brings a stronger inuence on the global
emissions quantity.
Therefore, the optimal emissions level of a young signatory i in Period 2 is
ei;2 = (n2)
 1
1 b (3.6)
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@ei;2
@n2
< 0 and @ei;2
@
< 0 mean the size of the IEA and the marginal cost of
the total emissions are negative to the optimal emissions level of a signatory.
It implies that larger a coalition is, lower each member country emits. This
is due to the group e¤ect, where the larger group make a higher impact on
the total emission. In other words, a higher total abatement level could be
made by a larger coalition. Also, the high marginal cost would lead to a low
emissions level. However, the technology parameter (b) has ambiguous e¤ect
on the emissions level.
The payo¤s of countries in two periods are
j;2 =
1
b
()
 b
1 b   
h
E1 + n2 (n2)
 1
1 b + (N   n2) ()
 1
1 b
i
(3.7)
i;2 =
1
b
(n2)
 b
1 b   
h
E1 + n2 (n2)
 1
1 b + (N   n2) ()
 1
1 b
i
(3.8)
All individuals will be beneted when the coalition is enlarged (@j;2
@n2
> 0
and @i;2
@n2
> 0). We also learnt that a nonsignatory j has a higher benet
than a signatory i and everyone pays the same cost, hence the welfare of a
nonsignatory is higher than that of a signatory.
First-stage membership game
In order to nd the formation of an IEA, we follow DAspremont et al. (1983),
a n2-member stable coalition exists when two constraints are satised
j;2 (n

2   1)  i;2 (n2) (3.9)
i;2 (n

2 + 1)  j;2 (n2) (3.10)
Here, i;2 is the payo¤ when an old country decides to participate in an
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IEA and j;2 is the payo¤ of the country who decides not to participate. The
number in the parenthesis means the size of the IEA. The internal constraint
(3.9) implies the incentive of participation of a signatory i. A country would
participate in a coalition as one of n2 member countries only if being a signatory
is better than being a nonsignatory. When the constraint is not satised, that
country would withdraw from the coalition. When the number of signatories
decreases and the coalition is no longer protable, the consequence is that the
IEA could no longer exist. On the other hand, the external constraint (3.10)
explains the incentive of a nonsignatory. A country would stay away from a
coalition when the payo¤ of being a nonsignatory is better than that of being
the (n2 + 1)-th member. When both constraints are satised, the coalition is
considered as stable.
Following, Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 discuss the decisions of the old generation
in Period 1 in two scenarios. The decision process of the two-stage game is:
countries rstly decide whether or not to participate in an IEA, then decide
their emissions plan in relation to their membership status. The game is also
solved by backward induction.
3.2.2 Decisions in Period 1 in the Myopic (MYO) sce-
nario
Second-stage emissions game
In the myopic scenario, the decision makers care about the welfare in Period 1
only. Similar to the objective function of the young generation, suppose there
are n1 members in the IEA in Period 1, an old nonsignatory j maximises only
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its payo¤ with respect to its individual emissions level (ej;1)
max
ej;1
j;1 =

1
b
ebj;1   E1

(3.11)
where ej;1 is the emissions level of a nonsignatory j in Period 1, and the total
stock of emissions E1.
Hence, the optimal emissions level of j is obtained from (3.11). The myopic
old generation emits the same level as the young generation does.
ej;1 = ()
 1
1 b
On the other hand, the coalition attempts to maximise the aggregate payo¤
in Period 1 with respect to the common emissions level ei;1
max
ei;1
1 =
nX
i

1
b
ebi;1   E1

(3.12)
The optimal emissions level of a myopic old signatory i is at the same to
that of a young signatory.
ei;1 = (n1)
 1
1 b
The post-distribution payo¤s of a myopic signatory i and a myopic nonsigna-
tory j in period 1 are
j;1 =
1
b
()
 b
1 b   
h
E0 + n1 (n1)
 1
1 b + (N   n1) ()
 1
1 b
i
(3.13)
i;1 =
1
b
(n1)
 b
1 b   
h
E0 + n1 (n1)
 1
1 b + (N   n1) ()
 1
1 b
i
(3.14)
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First-stage membership game
The stable coalition in Period 1 can be found with the two constraints by
DAspremont et al. (1983)
j;1 (n

1   1)  i;1 (n1) (3.15)
i;1 (n

1 + 1)  j;1 (n1) (3.16)
Here, i;1 is the post-redistribution payo¤when a country decides to participate
in an IEA and j;1 is the payo¤ of that country decides not to participate. The
number in the parenthesis means the size of the IEA in Period 1.
The internal constraint (3.15) implies the participation incentive of a signa-
tory i. A country would participate in a coalition as one of n1 member countries
only when being a signatory is better than being a nonsignatory. When the
constraint is not satised, that country would withdraw from the coalition.
When the number of signatories decreases and the coalition is no longer prof-
itable, the consequence is the IEA would collapse. On the other hand, the
external constraint (3.16) explains the incentive of a nonsignatory. A country
would stay away from a coalition when the payo¤ of being a nonsignatory is
better than that of being the (n1 + 1)-th member. When both constraints are
satised, the coalition is considered as stable.
It should be noted that IEAs being formed in the beginning of each period,
the coalition formation in Period 1 (n1) does not necessary remain until Period
2 (n2). The emissions level and the welfare will be a¤ected by the number of
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signatories, both the emissions level and the welfare could be di¤erent in both
periods. Given that that the coalition size remains the same for two periods
(n1 = n2), a young and an old generation emit at the same level. From (3.1),
we have learnt that the young generation has to su¤er an extra cost from the
accumulated emissions. The young generations welfare is worse than the old
generations. According to the concepts of sustainability, this can be labelled
an unsustainable system.
The outcome of the myopic scenario is summarised as follows.
Summary 5 In the myopic scenario, nonsignatories generate the same level
of emissions in two periods.
Suppose that the coalition size remains the same for two periods, the system
is unsustainable where the optimal levels of emissions for the two generations
are the same but the welfare of the young generation is worse than that of the
old one.
3.2.3 Decisions in Period 1 in the Sustainable develop-
ment (SD) scenario
The result from the MYO scenario shows that myopic decision makers would
generate the same level of emissions in two periods. Their welfare of two
generation depend on the parameters of the benet and cost functions, as well
as the coalition formation in each period. In order to ensure a sustainable
system, we now restructure the model for the sustainable development (SD)
scenario in Period 1. The social welfare of the young generation would be no
worse than that of the old generation. The two-stage game is also solved by
backward induction.
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Second-stage emissions game
In the SD scenario, the old generation considers not only the welfare in Period
1 but also that of that in Period 2. Let fj;2 denote the expected welfare of the
young generation under the coalition formation in Period 1. In practise, IEAs
do not usually have an expiry date. When the old generation make the decision
in Period 1, it is reasonable to assume that the young generation inherits the
membership from the old generation. The expected coalition formation in
Period 2 remains the same to the formation in Period 1. Given that there
are n1 signatories to an IEA in Period 1, the expected number of signatory
in Period 2 would be n1 6. In terms of its membership status in Period 1,
the old generation predicts the emissions level and the welfare of the young
generation.
An old nonsignatory js objective function is
max
aj;1
j;1 + 
f
j;2 =

1
b
ebj;1   E1

+ 

1
b
ebj;2   E2

(3.17)
j;1 5 fj;2 (3.18)
where  is the discount factor attached by one generation to the welfare of
the next 7. Given the goal of sustainability which is to maximise the cross-
generational welfare, a nonsignatory j cares not only about the payo¤ at
present but also the payo¤ in the future. It implies an intergenerational al-
truism, which means that the current generation does not ask for anything in
return from the future generation. The higher value of , higher is the weight
6However, the young generation reforms the coalition and decides its actual membership
in Period 2. The young generation does not have to follow the expectation of the old
generation.
7The discount factor  is assumed in the range of 0 and 1. It implies the weight of how
much the old generation cares about the young generation.
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put on the young generation by the old generation.
Inequality (3.18) refers to the sustainability criterion of which the welfare
of the future generation is no worse than that of the present generation8. It
implies intergenerational fairness which denotes that the present generation
does not sacrice the future welfare. When the payo¤ of the old generation is
higher than that of the young generation, the constraint is bounded and the
old generation will adjust the emissions level to maintain the intergenerational
fairness.
We therefore set up the Lagrange function with respect to ej;1 as
Lj (ej;1) = j;1 + fj;2 + j

fj;2   j;1

(3.19)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximisation problem in (3.19) are
@Lj
@ej;1
=   [(1 + )  j (1  )] + (1 + j) eb 1j;1 = 0; ej;1  0 (3.20)
@Lj
@j
= fj;2   j;1  0; j  0; j

fj;2   j;1

= 0 (3.21)
The members in the coalition will attempt to maximise the coalition payo¤
over periods. The expected payo¤ f2 is under the same membership status.
8We appreciate that it is unusual to impose a non-declining welfare criterion in a two
period model where welfare in Period 1 is compared with welfare just in Period 2. Given
that pollutant in Period 2 is una¤ected by what happens in Period 1, to ensure that welfare
in Period 2 exceeds welfare in Period 1, it will be necessary to reduce welfare in Period 1
signicantly. This may not be a very satisfactory model with which to study the impact of
the non-declining welfare constraint. However, the constraint is adequate to the concepts of
sustainable development.
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The objective function of the old generation is
max
ei;1
1 + 
f
2 =
n1X
i

1
b
ebi;1   E1

+ 
n1X
i

1
b
ebi;2   E2

(3.22)
1 5 f2 (3.23)
This can be rewritten in a Lagrangian with respect to ei;t as
Li (ei;t) = 1 + f2 + i
h
f2   1
i
(3.24)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximisation problem in (3.24) are
@Li
@ei;1
=  n1 [(1 + )  i (1  )] + (1 + i) eb 1i;1 = 0; ei;1  0(3.25)
@Li
@i
= f2   1  0; i  0; i
h
f2   1
i
= 0 (3.26)
To solve the problem, we discuss in the following cases:
Case 1. No criterion is binding (j = i = 0)
When no criterion is binding, j = i = 0. From (3.20) and (3.25), we yield
the optimal levels of emissions for a nonsignatory j and a signatory i in Period
1 are
ej;1 = [ (1 + )]
 1=(1 b) (3.27)
ei;1 = [n1 (1 + )]
 1=(1 b) (3.28)
The level of emissions of a signatory i is less than that of a nonsignatory j.
Signatories would cut more emissions when more countries are in the coalition.
The result also shows that the higher discount factor () and the higher emis-
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sion decay rate () would also lead to a lower level of emissions. It means if the
young generation is more valuable to the old generation, the decision makers
in Period 1 would do more abatement for the sake of the young generation in
Period 2.
Taking the expected number of signatories n1 into (3.6), the expected level
of emission for a signatory i in Period 2 is higher than the level for a signatory i
in Period 1. The level of emissions for nonsignatory j in Period 2 is also higher
than that in Period 1. Compared to the result in the myopic scenario which
the levels of emissions are the same for two periods, the old generation would
do more abatement for the young generation in the sustainable development
scenario.
Case 2. The sustainability criterion for signatories is binding (j = 0,
but i > 0)
When the sustainability criterion for nonsignatories is not binding, j = 0.
From (3.20), the level of emissions for a nonsignatory j is
ej;1 = [ (1 + )]
 1=(1 b) (3.29)
On the other hand, when the criterion is binding for signatories, we assume
i > 0. The level of emissions of a signatory i can be derived from (3.26)
1
b
ebi;1    (1  ) [E0 + n1ei;1 + (N   n1) ej;1] (3.30)
=
1
b
(n1)
 b
1 b   
h
n1 (n1)
 1
1 b + (N   n1) ()
 1
1 b
i
Suppose countries have a high discount rate (  1) and the remaining
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emissions is high (  1), an old nonsignatory emits [2] 1=(1 b) which is
less than the result in the MYO scenario. When the sustainability criterion
for signatories is binding, from (3.30) we learn that the level of emission for
an old signatory f(n1)
 b
1 b   b
h
n1 (n1)
 1
1 b + (N   n1) ()
 1
1 b
i
g1=b which is
the benet elasticity times the expected welfare of a young signatory to the
power of the inverse benet elasticity of emissions b. On the other hand, when
countries have a low discount rate (  0) or the remaining emissions is low
(  0), an old nonsignatory emits [] 1=(1 b) which is at the same level to the
result in the MYO scenario. Because the remaining emissions leads to an extra
cost to the young generation, an old signatory emits less than the expected
welfare of a young signatory.
Case 3. The sustainability criterion for nonsignatories is binding
(j > 0, but i = 0)
When the sustainability criterion for nonsignatories is binding, j > 0. The
level of emissions of a nonsignatory j can be derived from (3.21)
1
b
ebj;1    (1  ) [E0 + n1ei;1 + (N   n1) ej;1] (3.31)
=
1
b
()
 b
1 b   
h
n1 (n1)
 1
1 b + (N   n1) ()
 1
1 b
i
On the other hand, if the criterion for signatories is not binding, i = 0.
From (3.25), the level of emissions of a signatory i is therefore
ei;1 = [n1 (1 + )]
 1=(1 b) (3.32)
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Suppose countries have a high discount rate (  1) and the remaining
emissions is high (  1), an old signatory emits [2n1] 1=(1 b) which is less
than the result in the MYO scenario. When the sustainability criterion for
nonsignatories is binding, from (3.31) we learn that the level of emission for an
old nonsignatory f()  b1 b  b
h
n1 (n1)
 1
1 b + (N   n1) ()
 1
1 b
i
g1=b which is the
benet elasticity times the expected welfare of a young nonsignatory to the
power of the inverse benet elasticity of emissions b. When countries have a
low discount rate (  0) or the remaining emissions will be very low (  0),
an old signatory emits [n1]
 1=(1 b) which is at the same level to the result in
the MYO scenario. Because the criterion is active and the remaining emissions
leads to an extra cost to the young generation, an old nonsignatory emits less
than the expected welfare of a young nonsignatory.
Case 4. The sustainability criteria for all countries are binding (j >
0, i > 0)
In this case, j > 0 and i > 0. The levels of emissions of a nonsignatory j
and a signatory i can be derived from (3.21) and (3.26) as
1
b
ebj;1    (1  ) [E0 + n1ei;1 + (N   n1) ej;1]
=
1
b
()
 b
1 b   
h
n1 (n1)
 1
1 b + (N   n1) ()
 1
1 b
i
1
b
ebi;1    (1  ) [E0 + n1ei;1 + (N   n1) ej;1]
=
1
b
(n1)
 b
1 b   
h
n1 (n1)
 1
1 b + (N   n1) ()
 1
1 b
i
The discount factor () a¤ects neither a signatory nor a nonsignatory.
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The remaining level of emissions () is an important factor when the decision
makers decide the level of emissions. When the remaining emissions will be
very small (  0), the pollution will be absorbed by the nature. The old
generation would emit at the level as the benet elasticity of emissions b times
the expected welfare of the young generation to the power of the inverse b.
But if the nature cannot absorb the pollution and the remaining emissions is
at a very high level (  1), the old generation has to emit less if they consider
the cost of the accumulated emissions to the young generation.
The optimal levels of emissions for a signatory and a nonsignatory are
not obvious. A numerical example in the following section can illuminate the
results in these cases.
First-stage membership game
To nd a stable coalition in the rst period, we rewrite the internal constraint
and external constraint for the old generation as
j;1 (n

1   1) + fj;2 (n1   1)  i;1 (n1) + fi;2 (n1) (3.33)
i;1 (n

1 + 1) + 
f
i;2 (n

1 + 1)  j;1 (n1) + fj;2 (n1) (3.34)
The constraints with a cross-generational objective function imply that the
decision makers take the expected welfare of the young generation into account.
The constraint (3.33) shows that when the welfare of being a nonsignatory is
not higher than that of being a signatory, the coalition is stable internally.
On the other hand, the constraint (3.34) shows that the coalition is stable
externally, when there is no signatory have the incentive to leave.
Consider the case where n1 = N where all countries join the IEA, the indi-
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vidual levels of emissions are [N (1 + )] 1=(1 b) in Period 1 and (N) 1=(1 b)
in Period 2. The expected level of emission in Period 2 is higher than that
in Period 1. This implies that the old generation has lower benet to the
young generation, however, the cost for the old generation is also smaller. It
is unclear to say whether this is a sustainable system. Hence, the following
simulation provides a numerical example to illuminate the result.
3.3 Simulation analysis
Given N = 10 countries9, we assume the gap between generations is ve
decades because the international treaties are usually valid for a long term.
The decay rate of total emissions () is set as (100  0:866)% per year from
the natural annual removal rate of CO2 stock given by Nordhaus (1994). The
parameters of benet (b) is set from 0:01 to 0:1 and the marginal cost of total
emissions ()10 is set from 0:01 to 0:9.
Table 3.2 shows the individual level of emissions and welfare in the myopic
(MYO) scenario. As mentioned previously, a signatory produces less pollution
than a nonsignatory does. Hence, the payo¤ of a signatory is less than that
of a nonsignatory in both periods. The individual optimal emissions levels of
signatories and nonsignatories in two di¤erent periods are positively a¤ected
9We acknowledge that N = 10 might not a large number, compared to the numerical
examples in Barrett (1994) and Rubio and Ulph (2007). It is more di¢ cult to nd a robust
result in our exponential benet function with a case of large number of countries. Hence,
this assumption is adequate to represent an international negotiation while a robust result
could be found.
10Here we assume the marginal cost is at the range of 0 and 1. As we mentioned in
footnote 5, when the marginal cost  is less than 1, the higher technology will increase the
emission level. It implies that when the technology e¢ ciency improvement is faster than the
increasing cost, the overall emission will increase.
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 0:01 0:02 0:05 0:1
0:02
0BB@
52.02
25.83
52.02
10.24
94.68
93.95
93.78
92.10
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0BB@
54.16
26.70
54.16
10.48
44.42
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41.76
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61.43
29.62
61.43
11.29
13.56
12.68
12.59
10.60
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77.22
35.75
77.22
12.92
1.66
0.51
0.60
0.00
1CCA
0:1
0BB@
10.24
5.08
10.24
2.01
93.15
92.43
92.26
90.61
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0BB@
10.48
5.17
10.48
2.03
42.99
42.25
42.10
40.41
1CCA
0BB@
11.29
5.44
11.29
2.07
12.46
11.65
11.57
9.74
1CCA
0BB@
12.92
5.98
12.92
2.16
1.39
0.43
0.50
0.00
1CCA
0:5
0BB@
2.01
1
2.01
0.40
91.65
90.94
90.78
89.15
1CCA
0BB@
2.03
1
2.03
0.39
41.60
40.89
40.74
39.10
1CCA
0BB@
2.07
1
2.07
0.38
11.45
10.70
10.63
8.95
1CCA
0BB@
2.16
1
2.16
0.36
1.16
0.36
0.42
0.00
1CCA
0:9
0BB@
1
0.50
1
0.20
91.01
90.31
90.14
88.53
1CCA
0BB@
1
0.49
1
0.19
41.01
40.31
40.17
38.55
1CCA
0BB@
1
0.48
1
0.18
11.04
10.32
10.25
8.63
1CCA
0BB@
1
0.46
1
0.17
1.07
0.33
0.39
0.00
1CCA
Given N = 10 and  = (1  0:00866)50. From left top to down in each cell are
the emissions of a nonsignatory and a signatory in period 1 and a nonsignatory
and a signatory in period 2 respectively in the MYO scenario. From right
top to down are their individual payo¤s.
Table 3.2: Individual level of emissions and welfare of a nonsignatory and a
signatory in two periods in the myopic (MYO) scenario
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by the technology level (b) and negatively a¤ected by the marginal cost of total
emissions ().
The membership decision is determined ex ante the emissions game. A con-
sistent result in the MYO scenario is that there is always a 2-member coalition
in Period 1, and a larger 5-member coalition in Period 2. The individual level
of emissions and welfare are a¤ected by the size of IEA. The nonsignatories
generate the same level of emissions in two periods, while the signatories emit
less in Period 2. When the payo¤s between generations are compared, the old
generation has a higher payo¤ than the young generation. In other words, the
system in the MYO scenario is always unsustainable.
The results are summarised as follows.
Summary 6 In the myopic (MYO) scenario,
(1) Nonsignatories emit the same quantity in both periods. The old signatories
emit more than the young signatories. There is no fairness between genera-
tions, the old generation always has higher welfare than the young generation.
(2) The level of emissions is higher when the technology is more developed.
The welfare is therefore lower with the more advanced technology. On the
other hand, the higher the marginal cost of the total emissions is, the lower the
level of emissions and welfare will be.
(3) Few countries have the incentives to participate in an IEA in Period 1,
compared to the outcome in Period 2.
Table 3.3 reports the individual level of emissions and welfare in the sus-
tainable development (SD) scenario. Here, the discount rate for the next gen-
eration () is set as 0:5. The level of emissions in Period 1 is less than that
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0.50
0.49
0.24
37.78
36.66
42.12
41.43
1CCA
0BB@
1.54
0.49
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0.42
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0.27
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90.41
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0BB@
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0.41
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0.27
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36.53
40.41
39.64
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0BB@
1.27
0.40
0.58
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6.38
10.40
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1CCA
0:9
0BB@
0.13
0.43
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0.18
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89.66
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 0BB@
0.13
0.43
0.90
0.18
38.74
39.89
39.70
38.11
1CCA
 0BB@
0.12
0.42
0.90
0.17
8.79
9.95
9.8
8.21
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
Given N = 10,  = (1  0:00866)50 and  is 0:5. From left top to down in each
cell are the emissions of a nonsignatory and a signatory in Period 1 and a
nonsignatory and a signatory in Period 2 respectively in the SD scenario. From
right top to down are their individual payo¤s in Periods 1 and 2.
The cells with star * refer to the sustainability criterion is binding.
Table 3.3: Individual emission levels and the welfare of a nonsignatory and a
signatory in two periods in the sustainable development (SD) scenario
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in Period 2 in general. When the technology is more advanced (higher b), the
emissions level increases but the welfare shrinks. On the other hand, when the
marginal cost of the total emissions () increases, countries are more aware of
the damage and reduce the levels of emissions. The marginal cost has positive
e¤ect on the emissions level but negative e¤ect on the welfare.
The cells with star refer to the binding sustainability criterion that the
expected welfare in Period 2 are worse than that in Period 1. The system
could be sustainable in most cases, but not always. We have to emphasise
that the sustainability criterion is for the old generation in Period 1. When
the criterion is binding, the expected welfare in Period 2 is equal to the welfare
in Period 1. However, due to the coalition formation might be changed by the
young generation in Period 2, the actual welfare in Period 2 is not necessary
to be the expected welfare. The numerical example shows that the criteria
are not binding when the marginal cost of total emissions is high. In the SD
scenario, the system is usually sustain that the welfare of the young generation
are higher than the welfare of the old generation. However, when the marginal
cost is high, the system could be unsustain that young generation might yield
a lower level of welfare.
Compared to the result in the MYO scenario in Table 3.2, the level of
emissions of SD scenario is far less than that of MYO scenario. In addition,
the welfare of signatories and nonsignatories in Period 2 in the SD scenario
are usually higher than those in the MYO scenario. In other words, the SD
scenario is better to maintain a sustainable system than the MYO scenario.
Table 3.4 reports the coalition formation of IEAs in the SD scenario. When
the marginal cost of the stock of emissions () is low, the grand coalition
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 0:01 0:02 0:05
0:02
10
10
10
10
10
10
0:05
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10
10
10
10
10
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8
3
8
3
8
0:6
3
6
3
6
3
6
0:9
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6
6
6
6
The discount rate () is 0:5. From top to down in each cell
report the number of signatories in the periods 1 and 2.
Table 3.4: Number of signatories out of 10 for the parameter of the level of
technology and the marginal cost of the total emissions in the SD scenario
could be formed. Countries have a higher incentive to form an IEA when the
marginal cost is low. When the marginal cost increases, the coalition formation
in Period 2 decreases. However, the marginal cost has ambiguous impact on the
formation in Period 1. Compared to the result in MYO scenario where there
are always a 2-member coalition in Period 1 and 5-member in Period 2, the
formation in the SD scenario is larger than that in the MYO scenario. On the
other hand, the level of technology (b) has no impact on the coalition formation
in the SD scenario, while there is also no impact in the MYO scenario.
Table 3.5 shows the sizes of stable IEAs in the SD scenario in relation to
the levels of discount rate () and the marginal cost of total emissions ()
when the technology level b is set at 0:05. A grand coalition exist when the
marginal cost of total emissions is very low. When the marginal cost increases,
grand coalition does not exist. However, the marginal cost does not show a
clear correlation with the coalition formation in two periods. It seems that the
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From top to down in each cell report the number of
signatories in the periods 1 and 2
Table 3.5: Number of signatories out of 10 for the parameter of the perceptions
of sustainability and the marginal cost of the total emissions in the SD scenario
(b=0.05)
formation in Period 2 decreases when the marginal cost increases, while that in
Period 1 may rstly shrink then expanded. When the discount rate () is very
small, it implies that the old generations preference weighting attached by one
generation to the welfare of the next, the formation in Period 1 could be very
small but a grand coalition is still possible in Period 2. It is interesting that
the discount rate has small but ambiguous e¤ect on the coalition formation.
We have to note that a robust outcome is not found when the level of
discount rate s more than 0:05, however, the impact of the discount rate is not
as huge as the marginal cost of total emission. The coalition formation usually
increases when the marginal cost grows.
The results are summarised as follows.
Summary 7 In the sustainable development (SD) scenario,
(1) When the marginal cost of the total emissions increases, countries are more
aware of the damage and will reduce the levels of emissions. The individual
welfare therefore increases. Besides, countries have higher incentives to par-
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ticipate in an IEA when the cost is low. A grand coalition is possible in the
SD scenario.
(2) When the level of technology development is more advanced, the levels of
individual emissions increases and the payo¤s are smaller. The coalition size
is no change to a di¤erent developed technology.
(3) When countries have higher discount rate to the welfare of the next gener-
ation, the coalition formation may increase in Period 1 but decrease in Period
2. However, the impact on the formation is small.
(4) The sustainability criterion is usually binding when the marginal cost of
the total emissions is low. The old generation would emit less when the crite-
rion is binding. If the technology development is more developed, each country
receives higher welfare compared to the outcomes in the myopic scenario.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter examines the e¤ect of preference weighting attached by one gener-
ation to the welfare of the next and the sustainability criterion on the formation
of IEAs. To do so, we have built a model with a two-stage game in two periods
to examine the impact of the discount rate and the sustainability criterion on
the formation of international environmental agreements. We rstly consider
a myopic (MYO) scenario in which the old generation is myopic and does not
care about the young generation. It implies that there is no fairness and altru-
ism between generations. The old generation only concerns about their current
payo¤ in Period 1. The result shows that, only a small size (2 members) coali-
tion could possibly be formed in Period 1 and a larger (5 members) coalition in
Period 2. The simulation results show that the framework of an IEA remains
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unchanged given the level of marginal cost of the total emissions and the level
of technology development. The level of emissions decreases when the marginal
cost increases. On the other hand, a more advanced technology development
level could encourage countries to emit more and have lower welfare. The
system in the MYO scenario is demonstrated to be unsustainable.
This study then builds a model in the sustainable development (SD) sce-
nario which is characterised of two intergenerational behaviours. Firstly, the
countries have intergenerational altruism; they care about not only their wel-
fare in Period 1 but also that of the young generation in Period 2. Secondly,
the countries care about the intergenerational fairness whereby the old gener-
ation should not make the young generation worse o¤. The simulation results
show that a grand coalition is possibly formed when the marginal cost of the
total emissions is very low. But the impact of the discount rate is small and
performs di¤erently in two periods. On the other hand, the technology de-
velopment level has no impact on the formation. The sustainability criterion
is binding usually when the marginal cost is high, the old generation has to
reduce the emissions level in order to ensure the sustainability criterion is bind-
ing. The young generation usually has better welfare than the old generation
has. However, it must be noted that the criterion does not guarantee a sus-
tainable system. In a few cases, the system are still unsustainable because the
young generation could make decisions di¤erent to what the old generation
expected.
This study conrms the importance of the awareness of sustainability on
IEAs formation. When the intergenerational fairness and altruism are taken
into account, a formation will be expanded. Besides, the marginal cost of the
total emissions is an important factor for the formation of IEAs. The advanced
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level of technology development may lead a more e¢ cient production per unit
of emission, but it also encourages countries to emit more and have a lower
level of welfare.
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Conclusions
Typically, the studies on international environmental agreements (IEAs) are
based on the assumption of egoistic agents. They attempt to nd a Nash
equilibrium where all agents seek to maximise their own monetary payo¤s.
However, the existing laboratory evidences on IEAs often yield noisyresults
in the sense that individual choices are di¢ cult to map because their prefer-
ences are complicated and not always egoistic. This thesis has investigated
individual behaviours and incentives related to the economics of IEAs through
experiments and numerical examinations. The thesis as a whole contributes
to the economics of international environmental agreements by providing both
theoretical and experimental perspectives. More specically, the thesis takes
into account heterogeneity of players in IEAs and provides a deeper under-
standing of social preferences (of fairness, altruism and sustainability) in not
only a static model in chapters 1 and 2 but also a cross-generational model in
chapter 3.
Both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 have investigated factors that shape decision-
making in a static model which determines the coalition formation. The adop-
tion of an assumption of heterogeneous players and experimental methods
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advances the academic debate because they provide more realistic current ex-
planation. Chapter 1 has examined the impacts of inequality-averse prefer-
ences on individual decisions, and even on IEA coalition formation. Chapter
2 has examined the impacts of altruistic preferences. Both chapters 1 and 2
have provided experimental evidences on social preferences and how they shape
decision-making processes in a static public good game. Although there exist
some internal and external constraints which inuence the stability of coalition
formation, these two chapters aim to identify a particular unique equilibrium
condition so as to access individual preferences. As mentioned in the Intro-
duction, the assumption of a self-interested preference is not robust enough to
explain low free-ride e¤ect in a public good game. If we can more specically
identify individual social preferences, we can better understand how a stable
coalition can be formed.
In order to scrutinise the theories in each chapter, experimental methods
and numerical simulation have been adopted. Chapters 1 and 2 have em-
ployed novel experimental designs to determine individual social preferences.
Experimental methods have a great ability to capture individual heteroge-
neous behaviours which is one of the main assumptions in our models. The
subjects in the experiments take a series of decisions which indicated their
individual preferences on inequality-aversion and altruism. We test the ex-
isting theories that consider social preferences as important determinants for
motivating participation in an IEA (Kolstad, 2014; Hahn and Ritz, 2014) by
introducing eight particular treatments which are able to capture the subjects
individuality. In order to capture individual behaviours in IEAs, our model
has been designed with a unique equilibrium condition. Each subject has a
weakly dominant strategy of whether or not to join a coalition. In contrast to
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what the literature suggests, the results from this particular experiment design
do not support the necessity that higher marginal benet would enlarge the
coalition size and the total contribution. Instead, it illustrates the formation
is conditional on the combination of all agentsmarginal benets.
Chapter 1 that analyses the impact of inequality-averse preferences on the
formation of IEAs has suggested that coalition formation could be either an
unstable coalition, a stable coalition as suggested by the Nash prediction, a
stable coalition which is larger than the Nash prediction, depending on the
degrees of inequality-averse preferences. On the one hand, when one signatory
is strongly inequality-averse, the internal constraint may be violated and sig-
natories may leave the coalition. On the other hand, when one nonsignatory
has strong attitude to fairness, the external constraint will always be hold and
nonsignatories will prefer to have the free-riding benet and be absent from
the coalition.
Although the experimental evidences in chapter 1 conrm the impact of
inequality-averse preferences on coalition formation, the experimental out-
comes do not support the theoretical prediction. On the contrary, it has shown
that subjects with lower degree of inequality-aversion are more likely to act
strategicly by breaking the internal constraint. By doing so, they could force
free-riders to participate. When their role is switched to the opposite side,
they play strategicly by compromising their free-riding payo¤s. Some other
variables in the questionnaire, such as the political preference and religion
preference, have had a signicant impact on the subjectsdecisions. For exam-
ple, pro-right-wingers behave as those with low degree of inequality-aversion
and make some strategic decisions.
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Based on the ndings, Chapter 1 has shed light on the policy-making of
IEAs: In order to stabilise a coalition internally, the international bodies had
better emphasise the importance of fairness to signatories. Non-signatories
may feel threatened by potential damages if the international bodies fail to
achieve the targets of an IEA. In this regard, countries have higher willingness
to participate in an IEA. Although this study conrms the existence of the
inequality-averse preferences, it does not distinguish disadvantage loss from
advantage loss. It is intuitive to assume that advantage loss is smaller than
disadvantage loss, but it needs to be proved by experiments. Therefore, an
experiment that can indicate individual inequality-averse preferences can be
further developed in the future. However, there is a challenge of how to accu-
rately capturing individual preferences in this experiment.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of altruistic preference on the IEA forma-
tion. The theoretical hypothesis states that agents who have high degree of
altruistic preferences are more likely to cooperate. Depending on individual
attitudes to altruism, coalition formation could be either a stable coalition as
the Nash prediction suggests, or a stable coalition larger than that. All signa-
tories with a high degree of altruistic preference have no incentive to violate the
internal constraints by leaving a coalition. On the other hand, a subject who
has a high degree of altruistic preference may violate the external constraint.
The outcome of this is stronger cooperation in the coalition formation.
However, the experimental evidences show that altruistic preference is a
signicant negative factor to the incentives to participate in a coalition. This is
contrast to our theoretical prediction. The experimental results show that the
subjectsbehaviours are strategic in an interactive game . This is particularly
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so where subjectsweakly dominant are not to join a coalition.
Future work could explore intergenerational altruism by using alternative
approaches. For instances, Karp (2013) proposes an overlapping generation
(OLG) framework with intergenerational altruism integrated into a di¤erential
game between nations. By comparing analytic results for a linear model and
numerical results for a convex model, he argues that the importance of altruism
depends on model specics and the equilibrium type. Future studies could
examine his arguments using experimental methods.
Another future work for the studies of social preferences would be to explore
the link between individual preferences and behaviours. Strategic behaviours
have been observed in our experiments, but the reasons and the processes
have not been understood. Hahn and Ritz (2014) also nd that it may be
di¢ cult to infer countries true preferences for altruism from their observed
behaviour. The challenge to future studies on climate negotiation is to nd
out the link between playerspreferences and behaviours. Reciprocation could
be an interesting eld to be explored (Hwang and Bowles, 2012; Hadjiyiannis et
al., 2012a, 2012b). Positive reciprocity refers to the situation where countries
receive mutual benets and get reward for fair behaviour, whereas negative
reciprocity refers to that when countries retaliate against each other and behave
unfairly. When subjects have high degree of social preferences (either altruistic
or inequality-averse), they might expect that other subjects have similar moral
standard and act strategicly. Future studies can examine this hypothesis by
using experimental evidences.
Another possible perspective is that, individual preferences could vary over
time. Matros (2012) analyses an evolutionary version of the public good game
in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision
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rules. The dynamics of preferences would be another task for future studies.
Chapter 3 has investigated the discount factor attached by one generation
to the welfare of the next and how these di¤erent understandings of sustain-
ability shape from di¤erent generations individual decisions. At international
conventions on climate change, sustainability is one of the most important
reasons often quoted to form an IEA. However, it has not been discussed ex-
tensively in the literature. Chapter 3 has bridged this gap by investigating the
role of the discount rate attached by one generation to the next generation. To
this end, a numerical simulation where some parameters selected from existing
scientic evidences has been built. We consider a two-generation model with
a two-stage game in two periods to examine the impact of the discount rate
and the sustainability criterion on the formation of international environmen-
tal agreements. Decision makers live in one period: the old generation live in
Period 1 and the young generation live in Period 2. Each generation faces a
two-stage decision. In the rst stage membership game, each country decides
whether or not to join an IEA. The coalition formation is determined in this
stage. In the second stage, in terms of their membership status, they decide
their individual levels of emissions.
In order to examines the e¤ect of discount rate and the sustainability crite-
rion on the formation of IEAs, two scenarios are built: myopic (MYO) scenario
and sustainable development (SD) scenario. In the MYO scenario, countries
are myopic in the sense that the old generation cares about its welfare only.
In the SD scenario, the old generation cares not only its welfare but also the
welfare of the young generation. Besides, the old generation should not make
the young generation worse o¤. These two main features in the SD scenario
144
to represent the concepts of sustainability: rst, we assume that the present
generation has cross-generational altruism on future generations. Second, we
assume that the present generation concerns cross-generational fairness that
the welfare of the future generation is no worse than that of the current gen-
eration.
In the MYO scenario, there is no fairness and altruism between genera-
tions. The old generation only cares about their current payo¤ in Period 1.
The numerical result shows that, only a small size (2 members) coalition could
possibly be formed in Period 1 and a larger (5 members) coalition in Period 2.
The simulation results show that the framework of an IEA remains unchanged
given the level of marginal cost of the total emissions and the level of tech-
nology development. The level of emissions decreases when the marginal cost
increases. On the other hand, a more advanced technology development level
could encourage countries to emit more and have lower welfare. The system
in the MYO scenario is demonstrated to be unsustainable.
Then, we consider the preference weighting for the next generation and
the sustainability criterion in the sustainable development (SD) scenario. We
assume that the old generation cares not only its welfare but also the welfare
of the young generation. Besides, the sustainability criterion requires the old
generation should not make the young generation worse o¤. The simulation
results show that a grand coalition is possible in two periods when the mar-
ginal cost of the total emissions is very low. But the impact of the discount
rate is small and di¤erent on two periods. On the other hand, the technology
development level has no impact on the formation. The sustainability crite-
rion is binding usually when the marginal cost is high, the old generation has
to reduce the emissions level in order to ensure the sustainability criterion is
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binding. The young generation usually has better welfare than the old gener-
ation has. However, it must be noted that the criterion does not guarantee a
sustainable system. In a few cases, the system are still unsustainable because
the young generation could make decisions di¤erent to what the old generation
expected.
This study conrms the importance of the awareness of sustainability on
IEAs formation. When the intergenerational fairness and altruism are taken
into account, a formation will be expanded. Besides, the marginal cost of the
total emissions is an important factor for the formation of IEAs. The advanced
level of technology development may lead a more e¢ cient production per unit
of emission, but it also encourage countries to emit more and have a lower level
of welfare.
Future work could replace the existing assumption of homogeneity by adding
heterogeneous preference to the model. So far, Chapter 3 only examines a ba-
sic model that captures the notion of sustainability. As mentioned in Chapter
1, the assumption of homogeneous preferences limits our understanding of the
reality. In addition, the impact of di¤erent discounts rate on policy mechanism
can be explored further. For example, Carraro et al. (2009) have considered
minimum participation constraint which is a frequent mechanism in environ-
mental treaties. This mechanism is designed to reduce the free-riding e¤ect in
a public good game. The minimum participation rule can be considered in the
future study. In addition, the two-generation model may not a very satisfac-
tory model to study the impact of the non-declining welfare constraint. Other
designs, e.g. an innite-horizon model or over-lapping generations model, may
be better suited.
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To conclude, this thesis has illustrated individual incentives of participat-
ing in IEAs as well as the coalition formation through both experimental and
theoretical ndings. In static models, this thesis claim that the formation of
IEAs is a¤ected by individual social preferences. However, the experimental
evidence suggests that individual decisions are far more complex than our the-
oretical predictions with a single type of preference (e.g. fairness or altruism).
Subjects in the experiment behaved strategicly in the individual and interac-
tive games. Furthermore, their subjective attitudes to politics and religion also
play an important role in the willingness to participate. Whereas the nding
contrasts with the intuition that left-wingers and religionists are traditional
supporters in practical IEAs.
In a two-period model, this thesis has examined the impact of discount rate,
which are considered as cross-generational social preferences, on the coalition
formation. This study conrms the importance of the awareness of sustain-
ability to international environmental conventions. When the intergenerational
fairness and altruism are taken into account, a coalition formation will be ex-
panded. The numerical example indicates that the marginal cost of the total
emissions is an important factor for the formation of IEAs. In contrast, the
advanced level of technology development may lead a more e¢ cient produc-
tion per unit of emissions, but it also encourages countries to emit more in
total and have a lower level of welfare. Only when the marginal cost to total
emissions is low and the current generation concerns the future generation, a
sustainable system could be succeed.
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Appendices
Appendix 1.1
Proof. To proof the theorem, we establish an algorithm to nd a stable
coalition. Player n has the incentive to maintain n-member coalition if the
payo¤ sn (n
) = ( 1) +Pni i is positive. If player n leaves, the coalition
collapsed. Hence, player n gets nsn (n  1) = 1 when all player pollute.
When the internal constraint makes player n to be stable in the coalition,
all signatories have the same incentive to make it stable internally.
Meanwhile, the external constraint asks player N to stay away from the
n-member coalition. When player N is a nonsignatory, its payo¤ is nsN (n
) =
(N  n). If player N changes its mind and joins the coalition as the (n + 1)-
th member, the payo¤ becomes sN (n
 + 1) =
h
( 1) +Pni ii + N . When
the external constraint deters player N to join the coalition, all nonsignatories
are deterred and the coalition becomes stable externally. Hence, the theorem
is established.
By the internal and external constraints, the minimum number to form a
protable coalition is found. However, this coalition is not the only equilibrium.
A coalition with more members could be another equilibrium if and only if
both constraints are held. A unique equilibrium exists when any member is
irreplaceable by a larger coalition. It means that, if all nonsignatories would
like to replace the player n with the smallest marginal benet of abatement
(n) in the coalition, the coalition would collapse. In other words, a (N   1)-
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member without player n is unprotable. We can write it in an inequality
1 >
n 1X
i=1
i +
NX
j=n+1
j
To add the marginal benet of abatement of player n in both sides, the unique
equilibrium condition is rewritten as
1 + n >
NX
i=1
i
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Appendix 1.2
Proof. The utility of a signatory i with a n-member coalition can be extended
to the function with the degree of inequality-aversion as
usi (n) = 
s
i (n) 
i
N   1
X
m 6=i
max [m   si (n) ; 0] (3.35)
Because of the external constraint, any nonsignatory has higher utility than
what a signatory has. Signatory i has the disadvantage term but no advantage
term.
On the other hand, the welfare function of a nonsignatory j with n-member
coalition is
unsj (n) = 
ns
j (n) 
j
N   1
X
j 6=m
max

m   nsj (n) ; 0
  j
N   1
X
m 6=j
max

nsj (n)  m; 0

(3.36)
Nonsignatories could have both the advantage and disadvantage terms.
They are advantaged since their individual payo¤s are denitely higher than
that of a signatory. The one with the highest marginal benet of the total
abatement yields the highest payo¤ among others. Any other nonsignatory
would be disadvantaged to this country.
The stability of the coalition formation depends on the internal and the
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external constraints. The internal one can be displayed as
usi (n
) > unsi (n
   1)
=)
 
 1 +
nX
i=1
i
!
  i
N   1
NX
j=n+1
"
nj  
 
 1 +
nX
i=1
i
!#
> 0
The left-hand-side is the utility when i joins the coalition, and the right-
hand-side is the utility when i does not join.
If i is not strong inequality averse, the player would follow the internal
constraint and decide to participate the coalition. If i is strong inequality
averse, both the individual inequality-averse factor i and the disadvantage
loss are high enough, the player would violate the internal constraint and the
consequence is a collapse coalition.
On the other hand, the external constraint can be extended as
unsj (n
) > usi (n
 + 1)
=) nk  
k
N   1
X
k 6=j
max [j   nsk (n) ; 0] 
k
N   1
X
k 6=j
max [nsk (n
)  j; 0]
>
 
 1 +
nX
i=1
i + k
!
  k
N   1
X
k 6=j
max
"
(n + 1) j  
 
 1 +
nX
i=1
i + k
!#
where k is a player belongs to [n + 1; N ]. The left-hand-side is ks utility
when k is a nonsignatory and have the disadvantage loss from higher marginal
benet nonsignatories as well as the advantage loss from all signatories and
lower marginal benet nonsignatories. The right-hand-side is ks utility when
k is a signatory which only has the disadvantage loss.
When k does not have enough advantage averse, the player would follow
the external constraint and not to participate in the coalition. When k has
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strong inequality aversion, both the individual inequality-averse factor k and
k, and the disadvantage and advantage loss are high, the player would violate
the external constraint and join the coalition.
To summarise, given all subjectsinequality aversion is not strong enough,
both the internal and external constraint are held. There exists a unique stable
n-member coalition as we yield in Proposition 2. If the internal constraint
is held, but the external constraint is violated, there exists a stable coalition
which the size is larger than n members. If the internal constraint is violated,
due to any subject having strong inequality aversion, there exists no coalition
to be formed.
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Appendix 2.1
Proof. A stable coalition requires both internal signatories stably stay in
the coalition and external nonsignatories stably stay away from the coalition.
Given that n is the smallest protable coalition, an unique equilibrium condi-
tion ensure it is the only protable coalition as
n >
NX
j=n+1
j
With this condition, any signatory leaves the coalition, it collapses and all
countries have nothing. The internal constraint will be satised as
Ssn (n
) > Snsn (n
   1) (3.37)
which implies that any signatory can not be replaced by the participation of
all nonsignatories. With this condition and the internal constraint, a coalition
with n members are ensured stably.
From (2.4) , we can rewrite (3.37) as
Ssi (n
) > Snsi (n
   1)Pn
i=1 i   1

+ i
h
(n   1)
Pn
i=1 i   1

+
PN
j=n+1 jn

i
> 0
Because the coalition is protable and no signatory can be replaced, a coalition
with at least n members is stable internally. The altruism level i does not
a¤ect to this constraint.
On the other hand, the external constraint requires all nonsignatories to
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staying away from the coalition. It can be presented as
SnsN (n
) > SsN (n
 + 1) (3.38)
The constraint can be rewritten as
 
nj

+ j
h
n
Pn
i=1 i   1

+
PN n 1
j
 
nj
i
>
 Pn
i=1 i + j   1

+ j
h
n
Pn
i=1 i + j   1

+
PN n 1
j (n
 + 1) j
i
When a nonsignatory j is altruism neutral or its altruism level is not high
enough (j <
h
1+(n 1)j 
Pn
i=1 i
i
h
nj+
PN 1
j0+1 j0
i ), it would obey the external constraint and
a n-member coalition is stable. Otherwise, j would violate the external con-
straint when it has high level of altruism. It implies that when js altruism
level (j) is high, j is more likely to join the coalition and benet to everyone.
The size of the coalition would be bigger than n. Nevertheless, even some
countries violate the external constraint and join the coalition, the internal
constraint is ensured because of the unique equilibrium condition.
To summarise, the internal constraint can be satised with altruism but
the external constraint may not be held. Hence, the size of the coalition is
larger or equal to the smallest protable coalition size n.
164
Appendix 2.2
Result of the Altruism Test
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